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Using micro panel data, labor market transitions are analyzed for the EU-member states by 
cumulative year-by-year transition probabilities. As female (non-)employment patterns chan-
ged more dramatically than male employment in past decades, the analyses mainly  refer to 
female labor supply. In search for important determinants of these transitions, six EU-
countries with different labor market-regimes are selected as examples (Denmark, Germany, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, UK). Within these countries, women’s determinants of labor 
market transitions are compared by means of pooled multinominal logit-regressions.  
The outcomes hint at both, the importance of socio-economic determinants, like the life  cycle 
or human capital, but also address gender related differences in the paths of labor market 
transitions. Clearly, the observed cross-national differences are driven by specific national 
institutional settings. Among others, one of the most crucial features is the day-care infra-
structure concerning children, which either fosters or restricts a sustainable risk management 
between family and work in the respective countries.  
JEL-Classification: J21, J22, J78 
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*
 The paper is based on analysis of the European Community Household Panel survey (ECHP), for 1994-2001. 
The data are used with the permission of EUROSTAT. The data provider bears no responsibility for the analyses 
or interpretations presented here. The research was carried out as part of the work of the European Panel Analy-
sis Group (EPAG) on the project “The Dynamics of Social Change in Europe” (CT-1999-00032) under the Train-
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1  Labor Market Transitions in Europe 
For the 15 member states of the European Union (EU), it is well known that these countries 
vary substantially in terms of key labor market indicators, like activity rates, participation 
rates or the share of part-time employment (EC 2004a). In a second dimension, these differ-
ences become even more accentuated, if labor market attachment is compared between men 
and women (cf. table A-1)
1, although, for both the permanent full-time job is (still) the domi-
nant form of employment in the EU (Kaiser 2001).  As changes in employment patterns, and 
therefore labor market transitions, became more apparent for women than for men in the past 
decades, in the following cross-gender and cross-national comparisons are applied to put the 
main focus on female labor supply in the light of different institutional backgrounds.  
Keeping these dimensions in mind, the balance between risk and opportunity, either, for in-
stance, directed to employment opportunities or to other societal relevant activities, like car-
ing, is determined by the interaction of individual capabilities and institutional settings of a 
national welfare- and labor market-regime. These aspects partially influence individual incen-
tives whether to supply labor, creating a kind of circular micro-marco-micro dependency 
between individuals’ decisions and (labor market) institutions.
2 The labor-supply-frame of the 
following analyses focuses on three main features of the micro-macro-relationship between 
individuals and their institutional background: i. the system of social security, ii. the tax-
system, iii. the child day-care infrastructure. All these aspects do have a crucial impact on 
labor supply, both for women and men, as incentives to supply manpower at all or to supply 
labor at a specific quantum are affected.  
The entire micro-macro based development of changing employment patterns and changing 
institutions can be explained by the ‘modernization-approach’. As the term ‘modernization’ is 
quite extensive with the theoretical span of the discussion being quite wide, it is controversial 
towards what kind of goals ‘modernization’ should be directed. One of the leading contempo-
rary commentators on modernization, Wolfgang Zapf, distinguishes between ‘initial’, ‘catch-
ing-up’, and ‘advanced’ modernization, with the latter describing the most recent stage (Zapf 
1991; 1996). A main feature of advanced modernization, as emphasized by Zapf (2001, 501), 
                                                                          
1
 Tables with the prefix ‚A‘ are placed to the annex of this article. 
2
 These kind of societal different level-dependencies are thoroughly described by James Coleman (1986) and 
Bourdieu and Coleman (1991).  Discussion Papers  606 
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is a ‘new gender contract’ including the rising labor market orientation of women, a topic, 
which is also highly compatible with risk management in respect to labor market transitions 
(Schmid 2001).
3 Thus, a cross-national comparison may use different levels of modernization 
to scale the current structure of welfare and labor market regimes in terms of a new gender 
contract (Pfau-Effinger 2001). 
A new gender contract concerning labor market modernization may be based on simple legal 
non-discrimination acts. Accordingly, modernization could be interpreted as phasing the state 
out of the fields of active social policy and welfare. Conversely, modernization can be dis-
cussed as an approach to restructure the welfare state- and labor market-regime in order to 
supply manpower with ‘diverse abilities’ to cope with labor market transitions (employability, 
care ability, adaptability, ..., ...).  
As far as possible, these abilities should be associated with important economic and societal 
developments, like changes in productivity or new directions in the demographic develop-
ment.
4
 Nevertheless, adaptability in terms of risk-taking and flexibility should be combined 
with a distinct quantum of security, as a strategy of ‘flexicurity’ enhances the acceptability of 
labor market reforms (Schmidt 2002) and, therefore, accelerates the process of modernization. 
Nevertheless, one has to face that this approach cannot be assigned to a “flat rate  interpreta-
tion” of flexicurity, as there will always be different ratios of flexibility, insecurity and secu-
rity, depending on the nature of a specific labor market transition. In this respect,    Giddens’ 
consequences of modernity (1990) should be put as challenges of modernity.  
                                                                          
3
 For a detailed interpretation of the ‘Transitional Labor Market-Approach’, cf.  Schmid (1998; 2002a; 2002b). 
4
 For an overview of these trends, cf. EC (2004b). Discussion Papers  606 
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2  Determinants of labor market transitions 
The reasons for the increase in labor supply of women include greater access to education, 
declining fertility rates, and a rising employability of women, which is, for instance, a result 
of the increased importance of the service sector. These trends are somewhat contradictory to 
traditional theories on differences between male and female labor supply, which are based on 
the static unitary model of the household with a joint utility function and individuals acting 
and reacting independently of each other. This approach partially interprets labor supply in 
terms of biological differences, concluding that “this sexual division of labor has been found 
in virtually all human societies” (Becker 1994, 39). In contrast, other theoretical approaches 
suggest that individuals’ mutual independent rational choices are not the only factor (Nelson 
1998). For instance, an explicit bargaining-orientated dynamic approach can be used to ex-
plain changes in female labor supply over time. A shift in the female’s bargaining power 
within marriage associated with a rise in the opportunity costs of raising children, has encour-
aged women to increase their supply of labor and combine a specialization in domestic work 
with market work, mainly by part-time, employment (Ott 1992 and 1995). However, cross-
national differences in the institutional background are likely to affect the EU-wide rise of 
female economic activity, i.e. either to promote or hinder the labor market attachment of 
women.  
In terms of cross-national institutional differences that can be clustered to ‘families of na-
tions’, Gornick and Meyers (2003, 51) state that “(i)n the Nordic countries, the social democ-
ratic principles that guide policy design are generally paired with a commitment to gender 
equality, and the market-replicating principles in the Conservative countries are often embed-
ded in socially conservative ideas about family and gender roles. In the Liberal countries, the 
supremacy of the market system generally drives social welfare designs across all policy 
arenas.” 
In a cross-national, but cross sectional perspective, Kaiser (2004) finds that those differences 
in welfare state arrangements and labor market regimes that are related to the social security-
system, the taxation-system, and the child day-care infrastructure are most crucial for women 
to show differences in the opportunities of holding a specific labor market status. In contrast, 
variations in respect to ordinary human capital issues, like age or education (Killingsworth 
1983), are most important for European men in respect to labor supply. The relevance of the Discussion Papers  606 
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taxation-system for male and female labor supply is also substantiated by Dingeldey (2001) or 
Garibaldi and Wasmer (2003). In the six countries, only Germany and Portugal (still) stick to 
a pure joint taxation-model that, especially in the case of Germany, creates prohibitive high 
marginal tax rates with increasing working hours for the second, in most cases, female wage-
earner (OECD 2002).   
A general note on the public policy-, female labor supply- and fertility-nexus is delivered by 
Apps and Rees (2004). They find that “countries which have individual rather than joint taxa-
tion, and which support families through child care facilities rather than child payments, are 
likely to have both higher female labor supply and higher fertility” (l.c., 745). The effect of 
the demandability of the child day-care infrastructure on labor turnover is discussed by Hof-
ferth and Collins (2000). Their outcomes show “that the availability of care affects the job 
stability of all employed mothers” (l.c., 357), i.e. child care matters directly, if employment 
opportunities of women are addressed.
5 The described cross-European institutional differences 
are validated, for instance, by considerable differences in the enrolment rate in pre-primary 
education (table 1).  
Table 1:  
The child day-care infrastructure in European countries  
                
age DEN  GER  IRE  NET  POR  UK 
 
0-2 64  (1998)  10  (2000)   38  (1998)  5  (1998) 12  (1999)  34  (2000)
3-6 91  (1998)  78  (2000)  56  (1998) 98  (1998) 75  (1999)  60  (2000)
7-10 80 (1996)   5  (1996)  5  (1996) 6  (1996) 10  (1994)   5  (1996)
 
 
Source: 0-2 and 3-6 years: OECD (2001), 7-10 Years: EC (1998), 7-10 years (Portugal): ECN (1995); enrolment 
rates in % by age group, reference years in parentheses. 
 
However, it might be argued that an expansion of child day-care facilities may result in an 
inefficient supply surplus of the day-care infrastructure when no adequate demand would be 
met. Accordingly, the necessity of expanding the child day-care infrastructure would be rele-
vant for those countries only, where a suitable ‘culture’ or ‘tradition’ of female employment is 
                                                                          
5
 Earlier evidence on this topic is given by Heckman (1974). For further up-to-date work in respect to this issue, 
c.f. Michalopoulos and Robins (2000), Jenkins and Symons (2001) or Datta Gupta and Smith (2002). Discussion Papers  606 
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present, as in the Scandinavian countries.  These kinds of retentions can be falsified by em-
pirical facts.  In virtually every kind of welfare state regime, the discrepancy of desired and 
actual employment patterns and working hours are marked by a modernization hold-up. Com-
pared to the given employment opportunities, a clear expansion of female employment, both 
in respect to full- and part-time employment and a reduction of non-employment is reported 
by survey data (Chart1). 
 
Chart 1:  
Actual (_a) and preferred (_p) employment patterns in % 
 







  Man full-time/woman full-time   Man full-time/woman part-time
  Man full-time/woman not employed   Other  
Source: OECD (2001, 136), couple families with child under 6. 
 
Furthermore, different welfare state settings incorporate specific regimes of incentives that 
affect individuals in their labor supply decision-making. A prominent example is the field of 
maternity leave. Merz (2004) reports that “institutional changes in the federal legislation gov-
erning parental leave contributed to the observed changes in married women’s labor market 
involvement in Germany. (…) The strong increase in monthly real payments of parental sub-
sidies to new parents which took place between 1986 and 1991 coincided with a big drop in 
married women’s weekly hours worked” (l.c., 16). Similar evidence for this correlation is 
given by Ruhm (1998) for the European context.  Discussion Papers  606 
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In respect to maternity leave regulation in the six countries under consideration, Denmark is 
outstanding. Compared to the five other European neighbors, the duration of parental leave is 
comparatively short, transfers during this period are high in order to substitute forgone in-
come and child benefits tend to be low. Moreover, the entire length of parental leave is only 
admitted if fathers participate to a certain extent (table 2).  
In contrast, a somewhat different parental leave regime is currently in force in Germany, for 
instance. The duration is comparatively long, transfers are low and child benefits are high. 
Therefore, especially for women, this setting creates incentives towards a relatively long dura-
tion of maternity leave, whereas a low income substitution rate is unsuitable for men to take 
maternity leave in Germany. 
 
Table 2:  
Maternity leave and child benefit regulations 
 
  duration  transfer per month (EUR)  child benefit (EUR) 
DEN  14 +36* weeks   up to 1788  94 to 131 
GER  36 months  307 (2 yrs) or  450 (1 yr) 
 
154 




14 weeks  none  44 
POR  6 months  none  means tested 
 
UK 13  weeks  none  100 
 
*(36 weeks to be shared between father and mother) 
Source: Eichhorst and Thode (2002, 35). 
 
In sum, comparing different aspects of the institutional setting, Denmark appears to have the 
‘healthiest’ institutions that tend to generate equal employment opportunities between men 
and women and that foster incentives for females to get or to be employed. In contrast, the 
institutional landscape of the other countries under consideration either aim at a liberal (Ire-Discussion Papers  606 
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land and UK), conservative (Germany and the Netherlands) or residual interpretation of those 
institutions that tend to affect (female) labor supply. 
2.1 The  Data 
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a longitudinal data set, conducted for 
eight waves (1994 to 2001). It is organized by the Statistical Office of the European Commu-
nities (EUROSTAT, Luxembourg), the fieldwork being carried out by public or private statis-
tical institutions of the respective EU-member states.
6 The questionnaire of the ECHP con-
tains comparable individual and household micro-level data on employment, income, living 
conditions, demography, migration, housing and health. Per wave, over 136.000 individuals at 
an age of at least 16 years within some 66.000 households across the 15 European Union 
member states are included. For the first wave, as of 1994, the ECHP contains 12 countries. In 
1995 Austria, in 1996 Finland and in 1997 Sweden joined the ECHP. The data also includes 
observations from the Panel Study Living in Luxembourg (PSELL), the British Household 
Panel (BHPS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). These datasets are substi-
tutes, as for these three countries, the original ECHP-data was not continued after 1996. Since 
the original ECHP data is based on a harmonized questionnaire and since copies of the 
PSELL, BHPS and GSOEP data incorporated later on were aligned to the structure of the 
ECHP, especially for cross-national comparisons, it is a very valuable and unique dataset. 
2.2 Transition  Probabilities  in European Labor Markets 
To obtain an initial impression of transitions in European labor markets, the entire informa-
tion of the data is used by cumulative year-by-year transitions. For a time window of eight 
years, in the maximum case, seven year-by-year transitions may occur for a single sample 
person, comparing the starting labor market statuses tw with w = 1994, ..., 2000 and their re-
spective possible target statuses in tw+1 (Figure 1).
7 Based on these conventions, the initial 
                                                                          
6 
An introduction to the ECHP is given by Mejer and Wirtz (2002). For further information, also visit the websites of 
EPAG (www.iser.essex.ac.uk/epag) and EPUNet (http://epunet.essex.ac.uk).  
7
 For Austria, w = 1995, ..., 2000; for Finland, w = 1996, ..., 2000).  Discussion Papers  606 
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descriptive analysis refers to four starting statuses (full-time employment, part-time employ-
ment, unemployment or non-working).
8  
Figure 1:  
Potential labor market transitions tw ⇒ tw+1 
 
 
             full-time in tw  
⇒  full-time      
⇒   part-time     
⇒     unemployment   
     tw+1 
⇒       non-employment   
      
  part-time in tw    
⇒  part-time      
⇒   full-time     
⇒     unemployment   
     tw+1 
⇒       non-employment   
 
 unemployment in tw  
⇒  unemployment    
⇒   full-time           tw+1 
⇒     part-time   
  ⇒       non-employment   
      
  non-employment in tw    
⇒  non-employment      
⇒   full-time           tw+1 
⇒     part-time   
  ⇒     unemployment   
 
 
For thirteen out of the core EU15-countries (except Luxembourg and Sweden, due to insuffi-
cient data quality), some 504.000 year-by-year transitions are observable for 1994-2001. The 
age span of the observed population is set to 26 to 64 years with respect to tw+1. This restric-
tion should prevent observations of transitions from school to work. However, the other end 
of the age span fully includes older workers, who are about to retire. This is contrary to the 
current fashionable trend which is to ignore the older working population for analyses of labor 
market dynamics. We incline to follow this trend, since analyses of labor market dynamics 
should definitely include this experienced part of the working population that has to face early 
retirement schemes in sight of an unlikely reintegration into the labor market in the case of 
                                                                          
8
 To differ between full- and part-time, the OECD definition of these two working-time statuses is used (Bastelaer, 
Lemaître and Marianna 1997). Accordingly, full-time refers to at least 30 working hours per week, whereas part-
time coincides with 1 to 29 working hours per week. Discussion Papers  606 
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unemployment (EC 2004b). For the same reason, the analyses include the self-employed, 
since for the management of risk and opportunity, self-employment is one possible opportu-
nity to prevent the risk of under-employment or unemployment. 
 
In the following, transition probabilities are displayed by the use of cross-sectional time series 
data, i.e. persons’ transitions covering two years. The probability that xi,tw+1 = v2 is estimated, 
given that xi,tw = v1. The entire range of results, as sketched by figure 1, is displayed by table 
A-2. Chart 2 displays the incidence of full-time permanence. With no exception the probabil-
ity of full-time permanence is higher for men than for women in every of the 13 countries 
under consideration. Overall, the difference is about 7 percentage points with respect to the 
EU-average, with a comparatively high (low) difference displayed by the Netherlands, Ireland 
and Greece (Finland, Denmark, Portugal, Germany and France). However, it must be kept 
mind that employment rates and the share of full-time employment is quite differently distrib-
uted amongst men and women in Europe.  
Chart 2:  
Labor market transition-probabilities (full-time permanence) 
(full-time: tw ⇒ full-time: tw+1 in %, > 25 & < 65 years of age in tw+1) 







  male   female
 
Note: descended ranking according to full-time permanence (women), except EU-average.  
Source: ECHP, authors’ calculations (see appendix, table A-2). 
 Discussion Papers  606 
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In this respect, however, Portugal turns out to be an exception. Despite the comparatively 
residual setting of the Portuguese welfare state, for both men and women, employment rates 
and the share of standard employment are higher than in other (southern) countries. This find-
ing is probably due to fact that Portugal possesses the lowest wage level in the entire EU (ILO 
1997, 421), which forces most of the Portuguese to be attached to the labor market mainly on 
the basis of a full-time job (Ruivo et al. 1998, Santos 1991). This economic characteristic 
places Portugal between the statuses of ‘catching-up’ and a ‘continuing’ modernization of the 
labor market. 
Chart 3:  
Labor market transition-probabilities (part-time permanence) 
 (part-time: tw ⇒ part-time: tw+1 in %, > 25 & < 65 years of age in tw+1) 
 







  male   female
 
Note: descended ranking according to part-time permanence (women), except EU-average.  
Source: ECHP, authors’ calculations (see appendix, table A-2). 
 
An opposite picture is drawn by chart 3 for the incidence of part-time permanence. With more 
than 80% for Dutch females and a comparatively high incidence for part-time permanence for 
Dutch males, the Netherlands lead the range of the considered countries. With the highest 
share of part-time workers as a percentage of total employment in Europe and throughout the 
world, this country is an example of a part-time regime par excellence. In contrast, the four Discussion Papers  606 
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Mediterranean countries and Finland, where part-time permanence is more or less equally 
distributed among men and women, show up with a relatively low incidence of part-time 
permanence for both. 
Chart 4 observes the transition probability from part- to full-time employment. It becomes 
apparent that, with the exception of Finland, part-time relationships are a device for men to 
continue with full-time employment.  
 
Chart 4: 
Labor market transition-probabilities (part-time – full-time) 
(part-time: tw ⇒ full-time: tw+1 in %, > 25 & < 65 years of age in tw+1) 
 







  male   female
 
Note: descended ranking according to part- to full-time transition probability (women), except EU-average. 
Source: ECHP, authors’ calculations (see appendix, table A-2).  
 
In contrast, these kinds of transition are much rarer for female workers in Europe. The overall 
difference turns out at a level of more than 20 percentage points. 
An unlikely straight forward pattern in terms of gender differences emerges for the perma-
nence of unemployment (chart 5). In nine out of thirteen cases, men come up with a higher 
probability of permanent unemployment than women. The most remarkable gender distance 
in this respect is exhibited by Ireland and the UK. In these two European countries, men are Discussion Papers  606 
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traditionally affected by higher unemployment rates and longer lasting spells of unemploy-
ment than their respective female counterparts (Kaiser and Siedler 2000). Just in the last dec-
ade, it can be observed that in other European labor markets the risk of becoming and staying 
unemployed turns out to increase more significantly for men than for women. One main rea-
son for this development is the improvement of female employability in the service sector, 
simultaneously coinciding with their higher (voluntary or involuntary) ‘willingness’ to work 
on a part-time basis (Tijdens 2002). 
Chart 5:  
Labor market transition-probabilities (unemployment permanence) 
 (unemployment: tw ⇒ unemployment: tw+1 in %, > 25 & < 65 years of age in tw+1) 
 







  male   female
 
Note: descended ranking according to unemployment permanence (women), except EU-average.  
Source: ECHP, authors’ calculations (see appendix, table A-2). 
 
However, successful paths of leaving unemployment are also of a different character between 
men and women and between European countries. Regarding transitions from unemployment 
to full-employment (chart 6), the highest transition probabilities amongst females are dis-
played by Finland, Denmark and Portugal. On the other end of the countries’ range, the most 
apparent distance in respect of full-time (re-) employment probabilities is displayed by the Discussion Papers  606 
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Netherlands. Overall, for European women, the chance of (re-) entering the labor market via 
full-time is half the size, as it is for European men. In contrast, leaving unemployment by a 
transition to part-time employment is much more likely for women than for men, with the 
most extreme gender discrepancy displayed again by the Netherlands. Here, the probability of 
using part-time employment as a device to leave unemployment is four times higher for Dutch 
females than for Dutch males (cf. table A2).  
Chart 6:  
Labor market transition-probabilities (unemployment – full-time employment) 
(unemployment: tw ⇒ full-time: tw+1 in %, > 25 & < 65 years of age in tw+1) 
 







  male   female
 
Note: descended ranking according to unemployment to full-time transition probability (women), except EU-
average. Source: ECHP, authors’ calculations (see appendix, table A-2).  
 
A similar picture is drawn when transition probabilities from unemployment to non-
employment are observed (chart 7). In all countries under consideration, instances of exits to 
economic inactivity are much more likely for women than for their male counterparts. The 
highest transition rates for women are displayed in Ireland and the UK, while the lowest rates 
can be found in Finland, Denmark and Germany. On average, for European women, the 
chance to leave unemployment by entering the status of non-employment is nearly 100% Discussion Papers  606 
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higher than for men.  However, reasons and incentives of this path out of unemployment are 
mainly due to early retirement-schemes, most relevant for men.  In many European countries, 
the partially generous implementation of early retirement ended in a rethinking of this seem-
ingly ’successful’ instrument to cope with the persistency of unemployment in sight of the 
predicted shortage of human capital due to demographic reasons.  For women, however, the 
high probability to leave unemployment by entering non-employment is due to the fact that 
turning to economic inactivity is still a ‘socially accepted’ alternative for women, rather than 
for men.  
 
Chart 7:  
Labor market transition-probabilities (unemployment–non-employment) 
 (unemployment: tw ⇒ non-employment: tw+1 in %, > 25 & < 65 years of age in tw+1) 
 







  male   female
 
Note: descended ranking according to unemployment to non-employment transition probability (women), except 
EU-average. Source: ECHP, authors’ calculations (see appendix, table A-2). 
 
However, it must be kept in mind that the state of the so-called economic inactivity may im-
ply diverse activities, which are neither irrelevant to the economy, nor do many of these ac-
tivities deserve the label inactivity. At least for aging European societies, care-giving for the Discussion Papers  606 
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elderly will become even more important in the future than it is today. Similar to child care, 
an integration of these socially and economically highly relevant topics is still awaiting im-
plementation into the modernization process of European societies and economies.  
 
So far, for both the male and the female European workforce potential, the diverse reasons not 
to be employed coincide with a high probability to stay in non-employment (Chart 8). Defi-
nitely, this fact can be marked as an inflexibility of European labor markets. However, for 
females, the probability of staying in non-employment is lowest in Denmark and Finland. For 
men, the highest incidence of remaining in this labor market status is displayed by Austria and 
Belgium, two countries that counted on early retirement for long and therefore possess one of 
the lowest employment rates of the workforce aged between 55-64 today (EC 2004c, 20). 
Chart 8:  
Labor market transition-probabilities (non-employment permanence) 
 (non-employment: tw ⇒ non-employment: tw+1 in %, > 25 & < 65 years of age in tw+1) 







  male   female
 
Note: descended ranking according to unemployment permanence (women), except EU-average.  
Source: ECHP, authors’ calculations (see appendix, table A-2). 
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Up to now, the micro data was employed for the sake of descriptive purposes only. In the 
following, a multinominal logit-model will be employed to test determinants of labor market 
transition, explicitly.  
2.3  The multinominal logit-model 
The multinominal logit-model (mlogit) is an extension of the binary logit-model. Compared to 
the binary logit-model (logit) that is adequate for a dichotomous endogenous category, mlogit 
is capable of regressing more than two dimensions of the dependent variable. Therefore, 
mlogit is an adequate model for the longitudinal analysis of switches in the labor market 
status over time.  
The mlogit assumes that the categories of a (at least) threefold dependent variable are inde-
pendent between each other and are of a nominal scale
9. As for the logit, it is necessary to 
define a reference category for the mlogit. However, the interpretation of the mlogit coeffi-
cients is somewhat difficult. This drawback is due to the multidimensional character of the 
mlogit, i.e. the dependency of the respective interpreted category, like the transition from full-
time to part-time work, on the reference category (e.g. full-time permanence) and on the re-
maining categories of the model. The problem becomes obvious, when the sign of the coeffi-
cients has to be interpreted, as either plus or minus may be numerically correct, but can be 
used in a false way for the purpose of interpretation. 
To avoid the drawback of the mlogit, it is useful to interpret the calculated marginal effects of 
the model, rather than the results for the coefficients. Similar to the concept of elasticity, mar-
ginal effects can be interpreted as a change in the predicted probability of the outcome of the 
categories of the dependent variable for a change in a specific covariate, holding the remain-
ing exogenous variables constant (usually at the mean). This approach incorporates some 
advantages: Firstly, the model becomes intuitively more demonstrative, as marginal effects 
refer to the entire set of categories of the mlogit; no reference category is necessary anymore. 
Secondly, one can compare the magnitude of one marginal effect directly with another mar-
ginal effect. Hence, the interpretation of the algebraic sign of the marginal effects is not mis-
leading anymore.  
                                                                          
9
 The Independence of Irrelevant Alternative (IIA) is a restrictive assumption. However, if the relevant exogenous 
categories can be assumed to be distinct, an mlogit is an adequate model for multifold outcomes (McFadden 
1973). Discussion Papers  606 
2 Determinants of labor market transitions 
 
  17
The applied mlogit assesses what determinants influence the individual labor supply-
opportunities. For instance, the possible opportunities of an individual who was employed 







1 = full- time employment
2 = part-time employment












   Pr(y = m | x ,y = 1) =                                                [2]
exp(xβ )
      where β = 0, m = 1, 2, 3, 4, w = 1994, ..., 2000.      
 
As mentioned before, the resulting odds of the mlogit are difficult to interpret. Hence, more 
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for dummy-variables. 
Using pooled panel data, one has to control for repeated observations of the identical individ-
ual. An application for a robust estimation with repeated observations is the Huber/White-
Sandwich Estimator (Huber, 1967 and White, 1980, 1982). The repeated observations are 
treated as clusters, which are dependent within the cluster, but set as independent between the 
clusters. The divergence between the dependent within- and the independence-between is 
incorporated in a mathematical correction of standard errors (‘robust standard errors’). How-
ever, the correction does not change the numeric value of coefficients or marginal effects, but 
increases the value of the robust standard errors as compared to non-corrected standard errors. 
This results in a reduction of the number of significant coefficients or marginal effects.  
The endogenous variable is constructed according to [1], whereas the exogenous covariates 
cover the information, as displayed by table A-3. The household structure, a set of covariates Discussion Papers  606 
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measuring the number of children in accordance to the child day-care infrastructure and mari-
tal status mainly accounts for family related characteristics. The remaining covariates refer to 
general human capital variables, which are known to have an impact on employment prob-
abilities (years of education, age, tenure, income, state of health, citizenship and unemploy-
ment history, cf. Killingsworth 1983). The research question is whether and to what extent 
these factors vary in sight of different institutional backgrounds. If substantial differences 
emerge, the countries could be assigned to different levels of modernization and the country 
with the most developed ongoing state of modernization could act as benchmark for the re-
maining counterparts. 
For both, women and men, general human capital variables turned out to be determinants for 
labor supply. For instance, the likelihood to stay in a full-time job increases with age, but 
decreases at the very end of the employment-life cycle, which creates an inverse u-shaped age 
full-time profile. On top of the relevance of general human capital variables, the outcomes for 
women are clearly dominated by additional effects of family related characteristics whereas 
those effects of a negligible importance for men in all of the observed six countries. There-
fore, in the following only significant effects of those covariates that turn out to be most im-
portant for women, namely number and age of children, are discussed in detail. The effects of 
the other covariates are displayed by table A-4.1a-4.4c.  
With regard to the number of children in specific age spans, the outcomes suggest that an 
increasing number of children aged 3 to 6 results in a higher probability of Danish women to 
change from full- to part-time by 1.2 % per additional child in this age group (table 3). By 
contrast, for Germany, the figures show that (an increasing number of) children reduce the 
likelihood of staying in full-time, regardless different age groups. Instead of continuing full-
time employment, German women change to part-time employment, have to face unemploy-
ment or experience labor market transitions to non-employment. The results for the latter 
transition path clearly reflect the current German child day-care infrastructure. In sight of 
comparatively high enrolment rates for children in the kindergarten (age group 3-6, cf. above, 
table 1), no significant effects emerge for transition from full- to non employment with an 
increasing number of children aged 3-6. 
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Determination of age and number of kids for female labor market transitions  
(full-time in tw, part-time in tw; age span: 26-64 years in tw+1) 
DEN GER IRE  NET POR  UK                        
Status in tw   ft pt    ft pt ft pt    ft pt    ft pt    ft pt   
 
⇒  full-time in tw+1 
#kids  (0-2  years)  0  0 -4.6 0 -8.6 0  -11.2 -5.7 0  / -9.9  -7.0 
#kids (3-6 years)  0  0  -4.0  -10.3 0 -5.4 0 -4.2  -1.4 / -3.4  -4.3 
#kids (7-15 years)  0  0  -1.3  - 2.8  -2.7  0  0  -1.6  0  /  -2.1  0 
                
⇒ part-time in tw+1 
#kids (0-2 years)  0  0  3.3  0 5.9 0 9.4  6.2 0  / 6.4  5.0 
#kids (3-6 years)  1.2  0  2.2  8.7 0  0  0 3.9  1.0 / 3.4  4.1 
#kids  (7-15  years)  0 0 0 0  1.7  0 0  1.5  0 /  1.3  0 
               
⇒  unemployment in tw+1 
#kids  (0-2  years)  0 0 0 0 0 0  0.4  0 0 /  0.7  0 
#kids  (3-6  years)  0 0  1.2  0 0 0 0 0  -0.4  / 0 0 
#kids  (7-15  years)  0 0  0.4  0 0 0 0 0 0 / 0 0 
               
⇒  non-empl. in tw+1 
#kids (0-2 years)  0  0  1.5  0 2.3  4.0  1.4 0  0  / 2.8 0 
#kids  (3-6  years)  0 0 0  1.8  0 0 0 0 0 / 0 0 
#kids (7-15 years)  0  0  0.6  1.0  1.0  0 0 0 0 /  0.7  0 
 
Notes: Marginal effects from pooled multinomial logistic regression equations using Huber-White estimators. For 
other controls included, see table A-3. 0 = not significant at the 5 per cent level, / = insufficient number of 
cases. Source: ECHP (1994-2001), authors’ calculations (see appendix, table A-4.1a - A-4.2c). 
 
A similar occurrence, albeit with higher impacts on the changes in percent, can be observed 
for British women. This can be interpreted as an outcome of a child day-care system that is 
even worse than Germany’s.  The Netherlands exhibit a more or less straightforward picture, 
as the negative (positive) effect on remaining in full-time (changing to part-time) is highest 
compared to women in the other five countries. The finding has to be explained by the Dutch 
part-time employment regime. For Irish female workers, an increasing number of children 
also turn out to be an obstacle to continue full-time employment, too. Somewhat similarly as 
in the Danish case, an increasing number of children have only a minor impact on labor mar-
ket transitions of Portuguese women. However, the generally low wage level, entailing to the 
necessity to work full-time in order to have a second source of household income, seems to 
have a predominant effect on female labor supply. Thus, in the end, the findings for Portugal 
fit into the concept of this residual welfare regime, even though one might have assumed that 
the low level of child day care facilities and the weak support for mothers’ employment 
should result in a low female labor force participation in that country.  Discussion Papers  606 
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Concerning labor market transitions with part-time employment in starting year tw, with the 
exception of Portugal (again, due to insufficient number of cases in respect to part-time em-
ployment relationships) outcomes are available and of high relevance. In Denmark, no effect 
emerges for females, which points to the comparatively low importance of part-time employ-
ment for women, but also addresses once again the high state of demandability of the child 
day-care infrastructure in this country. In Germany, women either stick to part-time or change 
to non-employment but do not (re-)enter full-time employment. This is especially true for an 
increasing number of children within the age range from 3 to 6. This is mainly due to the fact 
that child day-care facilities are on the one hand available to a comparatively high rate for 
children within this age span, but in most cases care is not supplied on the basis of full day 
coverage. In the Netherlands, again a distinct part-time prevalence is exhibited by the results 
for Dutch women, as the probability to work via part-time permanence increases and the tran-
sition probability to full-time work decreases with an increasing number of children in any 
age span. A similar, but not equally obvious tendency to part-time permanence is shown by 
the UK. Given a rising number of children in Irish households, part-time arrangements of 
female workers tend to result in transitions into the non-employment status in this country. 
Turning to transitions from the state of unemployment, results for Danish women suggest a 
partial escape from unemployment either to full-time employment or to the state of non-
employment in the case of an increasing number of children in the age span of 0 to 2. This 
partially points to successful labor market transitions in the case of unemployment when hav-
ing very young children. A similar occurrence can be observed for German unemployed 
women. However, their labor market transitions in terms of exits from unemployment are not 
as successful as Danish women’s, because the effect of leaving unemployment is only caused 
by children within the age span of 7 to 15, while changes from unemployment to full-time 
employment are unlikely, whereas transitions from unemployment to non-employment are 
likely. In contrast, Dutch unemployed women either stay in unemployment or exit to part-time 
employment, but are not supposed to change to non-employment. In Portugal, women possess 
a likelihood to exit unemployment by a change to non-employment in the case of an increas-
ing number of children aged 3 to 6. The reverse is true for British unemployed women. They 
tend to solve their unemployment problem by a change to part-time employment. For Irish 
female workers, no significant effects emerged with regard to the starting status unemploy-
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In terms of transitions that are based on the labor market status of non-employment, no sig-
nificant effect occurs in Denmark. This is again due to the considerably well established pro-
motion of employment opportunities of Danish women who have dependent children. In the 
remaining five countries, a straight forward pattern emerges, namely, a rising probability of 
permanent non-employment in sight of an increasing number of children. This will be mainly 
due to child care activities. Accordingly, the chances of a change from the care duty to either 
part-time or full-time employment are negative. Again, Portugal remains as an exception, 
since only for very young children a positive effect is displayed to remain in non-





If one takes the well known results of the economics of discrimination into account (Arrow 
1973, Aigner and Cain 1977), the high extent of female investment in domestic work (EC 
2004d, 43-77) automatically reproduces employers’ misleading expectations due to the lack 
of information on male versus female job applicants and workers. The reason is that expected 
but not necessarily empirically evidenced labor market patterns of women can be clearly 
distinguished from expected male employment paths. However, statistically discriminated 
expectations are valid for women at large, regardless of whether their employment careers 
were planned to include children. Therefore, institutions with the broadest variety of labor 
supply opportunities are a device to kill two birds with one stone: to smooth labor market 
discrimination of women in general by means of minimizing the employment-family crunch.  
For the sake of smoothing risks and generating opportunities of labor market transitions, a 
rearrangement of the relevant institutions, like the social benefit system, the taxation system 
and the child day-care infrastructure have to be put on the agenda. However, devices to foster 
the flexibility and security of labor market transitions should always be concerted with respect 
to their assumed direct and indirect positive and negative externalities.   
In this sense, investments in pre-primary education are investments that pay in various re-
spects and serve to make progress in the field of reconciling employment and family. This 
goal coincides with many positive external effects, which are all relevant for a positive eco-
nomic development (higher employment rates caused by higher employment opportunities for 
parents and an increasing demand for employees to boost the child day-care infrastructure, 
higher taxes, less dependency on transfer income, etc.). The early promotion of future human 
capital also incorporates a ‘brain-gain-effect’, as there is strong evidence for a positive effect 
of pre-primary education on the development of emotional and social competencies and learn-
ing-to-learn capabilities (Barnett and Hustedt 2003), which will become at least as important 
as the formation of formal human capital by schooling or the attendance of universities. 
Hence, pre-primary education can be rated as a public good whose benefits reach across bor-
ders, communities, generations and population groups. To provide child day-care as a public 
good would be most important where child day-care is comparatively expensive, as in the 
UK, which prevents parents from affording this service (Management Issues News 2003). 




public authorities by means of public production and/or a controlled delegation to private 
providers. Furthermore, as these positive long-term effects are underestimated by individuals, 
namely parents, why should pre-school education not become compulsory like schooling? 
Moreover, this early investment in social and human capital should be combined with a fur-
ther dismantling of incentives to seek for early retirement. The restructuring strategy should 
become valid for all, employers, employees and the political arena. In this sense, the idea of 
fostering the concept of Life-Long-Learning should include the expanding of Life-Long-
Learning to the left- and right handed margins, that is pre-primary education on the one hand 
and the maintaining and further promotion of skills and employability of older workers on the 
other hand. 
With the focus on individuals and private households, strategies to minimize risks and to 
optimize employment opportunities should consider the mutual interdependency dependen-
cies between male and female partners and couples on decision making for time distribution 
on employment, care and leisure. In this respect, for instance, the maternity leave model in 
Demark (and in the other Scandinavian countries) pays the highest contribution to approach-
ing an equal distribution of opportunity cost related to child rearing.  In addition, private 
household services should experience further attendance to support chances to combine em-
ployment and the family. Yet, the potential of this option is still underrated in many European 
countries (Cancedda 2001).  
In respect of (female) employment opportunities, that can also be defined as transition oppor-
tunities under control of transition risks, the six countries considered can be assigned to a 
scale that measures gender-related labor market modernization. Two extreme positions can be 
identified. On the one hand, Denmark at the top of the scale with an equal opportunity regime 
that has to be assessed as ‘continuing’ modernization. On the other hand, Germany the UK 
and Ireland at the bottom of the scale, with obvious institutional lags that still point to a male 
breadwinner regime, either embedded in a liberal or in a conservative frame. In between, the 
conservative/social democratic part-time regime for women of the Netherlands is assigned. 
However, the straight focus on the part-time solution is of an ambivalent nature, as there is 
ample evidence that the metamorphosis of part-time employment in the Netherlands from 
atypical to typical (Visser et al. 2004) also incorporates new risks that are located on a some-
what higher level, like wage and career penalties (Giovanni and Hassink 2005). Although the 
latter three countries show features of a continuing modernization, their performance in terms 




the Danish case. Since Portugal still shows some features of a ‘catching-up’ modernization, as 
the Portuguese low wage level is essential to explain similarities in the outcomes of the analy-
ses, the Portuguese case cannot unequivocally be assessed as ‘continuing’ modernization. 
Hence, Portugal cannot really be compared to the other four countries. 
 All things considered, a joint European strategy that entails to cope with the expected scarcity 
of skilled labor resulting from demographic trends should set the increasing educational at-
tainment and rising labor market participation of women into a flexible but sustainable frame 
for (re-)accessing the labor market. The Danish case already provides an example of good 
practice towards gender related modernization of the labor market on the bases of equal labor 
market opportunities.  
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 ANNEX   
 
Table A-1: Key Labor Market Indicators (2001) 
  Men & Women 
  AUS BEL DEN FIN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA NET LUX POR SPA SWE UK EU15 
 Total population (000)  7967 10263 5321 5166 57726 81349 10356 3853 57229 15837 433 10294 39972 8889 58856  373483 
 Population aged 15-64 (000)  5411 6728 3545 3450 37682 54976 6858 2600 38645 10801 293 6959 27437 5739 38761  249888 
 Total employment (000)  4077 4148 2792 2330 24716 38917 3921 1741 23567 8277 277 5098 16094 4346 29481  169781 
 Population in employment aged 15-64 (000)  3707 4033 2700 2350 23659 36188 3802 1708 21169 8005 185 4782 15839 4249 27803  160074 
 Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)  68.5 59.9 76.2 68.1 62.8 65.8 55.4 65.7 54.8 74.1 63.1 68.7 57.7 74.0 71.7 64.1 
 FTE employment rate (% population aged 15-64)  63.4 55.8 69.8 65.7 59.9 58.6 55.1 60.7 52.7 58.1 60.0 67.2 55.3 68.4 62.2 58.7 
 Part-time employment (% total employment)  18.2 18.5 20.2 12.2 16.3 20.9 4.0 16.4 8.4 42.2 10.4 11.0 7.9 21.1 24.6 17.8 
 Fixed term contracts (% total employment)  7.8 8.8 9.2 16.4 14.6 12.4 12.6 5.2 9.8 14.3 5.6 20.4 31.7 15.2 6.7 13.3 
 Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)  71.3 64.2 79.9 75.0 68.7 71.5 62.1 68.4 60.6 75.8 64.4 71.8 64.5 77.9 75.6 69.2 
 Total unemployment (000)  140 289 124 238 2212 3110 452 69 2249 198 4 213 1889 224 1489  12893 
 Unemployment rate (% labor force 15+)  3.6 6.7 4.3 9.1 8.5 7.8 10.4 3.9 9.4 2.4 2.1 4.1 10.6 4.9 5.0 7.4 
 Long term unemployment rate (% labor force)  0.9 3.2 0.8 2.5 3.0 3.8 5.4 1.2 5.8 0.6 0.6 1.5 3.9 1.0 1.3 3.1 











Table A-1 (contd.): Key Labor Market Indicators (2001)  
  Men 
AUS BEL DEN FIN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA NET LUX POR SPA SWE UK EU15 
 Total population (000)  3855 5018 2632 2512 28010 39738 5004  1913 27764 7865 214 4966 19569 4393 29107  182542 
 Population aged 15-64 (000)  2695 3388 1792 1733 18631 27716 3334  1305 19258 5469 148 3412 13747 2916 19553  125098 
 Total employment (000)  2266 2400 1494 1220 13578 21715 2441  1023 14738 4691 175 2800 10123 2270 16268  97181 
 Population in employment aged 15-64 (000)  2060 2331 1438 1227 12992 20164 2360  997 13201 4526 111 2618 9957 2208 15309  91421 
 Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)  76.4 68.8 80.2 70.8 69.7 72.8 70.8  76.4 68.6 82.8 75.0 76.7 72.4 75.7 78.3 73.1 
 FTE employment rate (% population aged 15-64)  76.0 68.6 76.9 69.8 70.3 70.9 71.2  75.6 67.6 75.0 74.9 77.3 71.8 73.6 74.8 71.5 
 Part-time employment (% total employment)  4.8 5.2 10.2 7.9 5.0 n.a. 2.2 6.6 3.5 20.0 1.4 6.7 2.7 10.8 8.9  6.2 
 Fixed term contracts (% total employment)  7.2 6.3 7.7 12.9 13.2 12.1 10.9 4.3 8.3 11.9 5.2 18.6 30.0 12.9 6.0 12.3 
 Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)  79.5 73.2 83.8 77.6 75.2 78.9 76.2  79.7 74.1 84.3 76.3 79.4 78.3 79.9 82.9 78.3 
 Total unemployment (000)  67 150 59 117 988 1717 181  42 1057 92 2 91 809 124 910  6402 
 Unemployment rate (% labor force 15+)  3.2 6.0 3.9 8.6 7.0 7.8 6.9 4.0 7.3 2.0 1.7 3.2 7.5 5.2 5.5  6.5 
 Long term unemployment rate (% labor force)  0.7 3.0 0.7 2.7 2.4 3.7 3.1 1.6 4.5 0.5 0.5 1.2 2.3 1.2 1.7  2.7 






Table A-1 (contd.): Key Labor Market Indicators (2001) 
 
  Women 
AUS BEL DEN FIN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA NET LUX POR SPA SWE UK EU15 
 Total population (000)  4112 5245 2689 2654 29716 41612 5352  1940 29465 7972 219 5329 20403 4496 29750 190941 
 Population aged 15-64 (000)  2716 3341 1752 1717 19051 27260 3524  1296 19388 5332 145 3546 13689 2823 19209 124789 
 Total employment (000)  1811 1748 1299 1109 11138 17202 1480  718 8828 3585 102 2299 5971 2077 13213  72600 
 Population in employment aged 15-64 (000)  1647 1702 1261 1123 10667 16024 1443  712 7968 3479 74 2164 5883 2041 12494  68653 
 Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)  60.7 51.0 72.0 65.4 56.0 58.8 40.9  54.9 41.1 65.2 50.9 61.0 43.0 72.3 65.0 55.0 
 FTE employment rate (% population aged 15-64)  50.9 43.0 63.0 61.8 50.0 46.5 40.0  45.7 38.1 41.6 45.1 57.6 38.8 63.3 50.2 46.2 
 Part-time employment (% total employment) 34.9 36.9 31.6 16.8 30.1 n.a. 7.1  30.5 16.6 71.3 25.8 16.4 16.8 33.0 44.0 33.4 
 Fixed term contracts (% total employment)  8.6 12.0 10.7 19.9 16.2 12.6 15.0  6.2 11.9 17.4 6.4 22.6 34.3 17.6 7.5 14.5 
 Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)  63.2 55.1 75.9 72.4 62.4 63.9 48.7  57.1 47.3 67.1 52.2 64.5 50.7 75.7 68.1 60.2 
 Total unemployment (000)  72 139 65 121 1224 1393 271  28 1191 106 2 122 1079 100 579  6491 
 Unemployment rate (% labor force 15+)  4.2 7.6 4.9 9.7 10.3 7.9 15.5 3.8 12.9 2.9 2.7 5.1 15.4 4.5 4.4 8.6 
 Long term unemployment rate (% labor force)  1.1 3.6 1.0 2.3 3.7 4.1 8.6 0.8 8.0 0.8 0.7 1.9 6.3 0.8 0.8  3.8 
                       






Table A-2: Transition probabilities 
 
tw ⇒ tw+1  (in %; 1= full-time, 2= part-time, 3=unemployment, 4=non-employment) 
 
  Austria (male)   Belgium  (male)    Denmark  (male)   Finland  (female) 
   t w+1     t w+1     t w+1     t w+1 
    1 2 3 4      1  2  3  4      1  2  3  4     1  2  3  4 
1  94.9 0.9 1.1 3.1   1  95.9 1.3 0.9 1.9 1  95.1 1.3 1.6 2.0  1  94.1 1.8 1.9 2.2 
2  28.6 47.6 3.3 20.5   2  32.9 49.1 3.1 14.9 2  29.9 49.9 4.8 15.5  2  32.1 46.3 4.6 17.0 
3  40.9 4.9 35.6 18.7   3  30.6 6.1 35.8 27.6 3  48.6 5.8 25.1 20.5  3  36.1 4.1 42.6 17.2 
tw 
4  3.7 2.8 2.1 91.4   4  5.1 1.7 3.4 89.9
 
tw 
4  8.5 5.5 5.8 80.1  4  7.6 4.0 4.5 83.9 
   76.3 2.4 2.0  19.3      79.2 2.9 2.3 15.2      82.6 3.5 3.1 10.8     76.6 4.0 4.8 14.6 
 
  Austria (female)   Belgium  (female)    Denmark  (female)   Finland  (female) 
   t w+1     t w+1     t w+1     t w+1 
    1 2 3 4      1  2  3  4     1  2  3  4     1  2  3  4 
1  87.1 5.7 1.5 5.7   1 89.3 6.7 1.2 2.8 1  89.9 4.2 2.0 3.9  1 89.0 4.2 2.7 4.1 
2  14.5 73.3 1.8 10.5   2 14.3 74.8 2.0 9.0 2  10.8 68.2 3.4 10.4  2 33.5 45.8 6.6 14.1 
3  18.1 22.9 29.2 29.4   3 13.8 15.9 32.6 37.6 3  33.0 12.4 29.6 25.0  3 33.2 9.2 36.3 21.2 
tw 
4  3.1 5.8 2.2 89.0   4  1.8 3.7 4.0 90.5
 
tw 
4  10.0 6.1 6.1 77.8  4 10.4 5.5 7.1 77.0 
   38.4 18.2 2.5  40.8      42.3 18.8 3.8 35.2      60.8 14.3 4.8 20.6    66.1 8.2 6.1 19.6 
 
The rows reflect the initial values of the starting labor market status in tw and the columns reflect the final values for every year in tw+1.  








Table A-2 (contd.): transition probabilities  
tw ⇒ tw+1  (in %; 1= full-time, 2= part-time, 3=unemployment, 4=non-employment) 
 France  (male)    Germany  (male)    Greece (male)    Ireland (male) 
   t w+1    t w+1     t w+1    t w+1 
    1 2 3 4      1 2 3 4      1 2 3 4      1 2 3 4 
1  94.6 1.2 1.6 2.6   1  92.7 1.8 2.3 3.3 1  93.1 2.2 1.9 2.8  1  94.3 2.4 1.4 1.9 
2  33.9 49.2 6.6 10.4   2  37.2 43.1 3.8 16.0 2  42.3 45.0 3.5 9.2  2  26.2 60.3 5.7 7.8 
3  27.0 6.0 43.7 23.3   3  41.0 5.1 36.3 17.6 3  46.0 6.0 34.0 14.1  3  20.9 12.8 43.8 22.5 
tw 
4  9.0 1.8 4.3 85.0   4  7.9 5.6 5.0 81.5
 
tw 
4  7.1 2.2 3.4 87.4  4  5.7 5.4 6.9 82.0 
   73.8 3.2 4.3  18.7     76.8 4.1 4.3 14.7     77.8 4.3 3.6 14.3    73.3 7.5 5.1  14.0 
 
 France  (female)    Germany  (female)    Greece (female)    Ireland (female) 
   t w+1    t w+1     t w+1    t w+1 
    1 2 3 4      1 2 3 4      1 2 3 4      1 2 3 4 
1  88.7 4.5 2.0 4.9   1  87.5 5.7 2.8 4.0 1  83.1 6.0 2.5 8.4  1  82.8 9.9 1.7 5.6 
2  17.2 66.5 5.1 1.3   2  13.3 73.2 2.6 11.0 2  26.5 54.9 2.7 16.0  2  12.5 71.4 2.1 14.0 
3  15.5 8.6 43.8 32.1   3  26.2 15.1 33.1 25.6 3  19.4 5.8 38.3 36.5  3  13.0 23.3 23.3 40.3 
tw 
4  4.2 3.1 4.5 88.2   4  3.1 8.6 3.7 84.7
 
tw 
4  5.0 2.4 2.6 90.0  4  2.7 7.1 2.3 87.9 
   43.0 11.9 6.3  38.9     42.2 21.4 4.7 31.7     35.1 8.3 4.7 51.9    26.2 21.0 2.8  50.1 
 
The rows reflect the initial values of the starting labor market status in tw and the columns reflect the final values for every year in tw+1.  






Table A-2 (contd.): Transition probabilities  
tw ⇒ tw+1  (in %; 1= full-time, 2= part-time, 3=unemployment, 4=non-employment) 
 Italy  (male)    Netherlands  (male)   Portugal  (male)   Spain  (male) 
   t w+1    t w+1     t w+1    t w+1 
    1 2 3 4      1 2 3 4      1 2 3 4      1 2 3 4 
1  93.7 1.6 1.7 3.0   1  95.7 1.9 0.6 1.8 1  95.1 1.1 1.1 2.6  1  92.2 1.3 3.8 2.8 
2  30.8 49.9 8.2 11.1   2  30.6 58.3 1.2 10.0 2  34.3 45.4 2.3 18.0  2  49.4 24.1 13.6 13.0 
3  28.5 6.9 50.2 14.3   3  40.5 7.2 27.5 24.9 3  46.3 2.4 29.1 22.2  3  39.9 4.9 40.4 14.8 
tw 
4  5.3 2.1 5.7 86.8   4  7.6 2.9 3.1 86.5
 
tw 
4  9.1 3.9 1.9 85.2  4  6.6 2.3 7.0 84.2 
   71.9 4.1 5.8  18.1     80.6 5.0 1.4 13.0     81.0 2.7 1.9 14.4    73.8 2.4 8.0  15.9 
 
  Italy (female)    Netherlands (female)    Portugal (female)    Spain (female) 
   t w+1    t w+1     t w+1    t w+1 
    1 2 3 4      1 2 3 4      1 2 3 4      1 2 3 4 
1  87.0 5.3 2.1 5.6   1  82.6 12.5 1.1 3.8 1  89.9 3.6 1.5 4.9  1  84.6 4.5 4.1 6.8 
2  18.3 66.1 4.6 11.3   2  7.9 83.7 1.2 7.3 2  21.6 61.8 1.2 15.4  2  22.0 48.4 9.7 19.9 
3  11.1 7.3 45.1 36.6   3  10.6 26.2 24.8 38.5 3  32.6 6.5 26.6 34.3  3  16.8 10.1 40.8 32.4 
tw 
4  2.8 2.0 5.2 90.1   4  2.1 8.2 4.8 84.9
 
tw 
4  6.0 4.1 1.7 88.2  4  3.7 2.9 6.4 86.9 
   32.3 10.0 7.4  50.3     24.6 37.9 3.3 34.2     50.1 9.1 2.3 37.6    31.3 7.8 9.9  51.0 
 
The rows reflect the initial values of the starting labor market status in tw and the columns reflect the final values for every year in tw+1.  







Table A-2 (contd.): transition probabilities  
tw ⇒ tw+1  (in %; 1= full-time, 2= part-time, 3=unemployment, 4=non-employment) 
  UK (male)    UK (female)    EU-13 (male)    EU-13 (female) 
   t w+1    t w+1     t w+1    t w+1 
    1 2 3 4      1 2 3 4      1 2 3 4      1 2 3 4 
1  94.2 2.5 1.4 1.9   1  86.5 8.6 1.2 3.8 1  94.0 1.6 1.8 2.6  1  87.1 5.8 2.1 5.0 
2  43.3 44.3 4.0 8.5   2  12.9 75.7 1.5 9.9 2  35.2 47.5 5.2 12.1  2  15.0 71.0 2.8 11.2 
3  30.9 7.2 43.9 18.0   3  18.4 21.8 20.9 39.0 3  35.5 6.1 40.6 17.8  3  18.3 11.4 37.3 33.0 
tw 
4  6.1 3.6 4.6 85.7   4  3.3 10.4 2.0 84.4
 
tw 
4  6.9 3.1 4.6 85.5  4  3.8 4.7 4.1 87.5 
   78.9 4.8 3.9  12.5     41.1 28.0 1.9 29.1     76.6 3.9 4.2 15.3    39.2 16.1 5.0  39.8 
 
The rows reflect the initial values of the starting labor market status in tw and the columns reflect the final values for every year in tw+1.  
Marginal distributions may not sum up correctly due to rounding errors.  
 










Table A-3: Determinants of labor market transitions (mlogit-model) 
 
related field  variable  definition  time reference 
household structure  si_hhd  single  
    lopa_hhd  lone parent  
   (kid_hhd  couple  with  kids)  tw 
    nkid_hhd  couple, no kids 
    oth_hhd  other   
# of kids in age spans  s_kid0-2  # kids (age span 0-2) 
    s_kid3-6  # kids (age span 3-6)  tw 
    s_kid7-15  # kids (age span 7-15)   
marital status  unmarr  unmarried   
    (mar_wid  married or widowed)  tw 
    sep_div  separated or divorced  
education  y_edu  years of education   tw 
age  age  years of age  
    age_q  years of age, squared  
tw 
tenure  tenu  years job tenure   
    tenu_q  years job tenure, squared   
income  ln_incph  log of net income per hour  tw 
    o_hhdinc  other household income   tw 
    do_hhdinc  difference of other household income   tw - tw+1 
state of health  sick  bad health state   tw 
citizenship  foreign  foreigner      tw 
st_alo5  short term unemployment in past 5 years   unemployment  
history  lt_alo5  long term unemployment in past 5 years 
tw-5 - tw 





Table A-4.1a.: Marginal Effects of  mlogit-regressions (full-time employment in tw,)  
  Denmark Germany 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
si_hhd 0.0083  (0.0127)  -0.0067  (0.0100) 0.0011 (0.0055) -0.0027 (0.0050) -0.0033 (0.0138) -0.0039 (0.0106) -0.0025 (0.0044) 0.0097 (0.0061) 
lopa_hhd 0.0046  (0.0128)  -0.0163  (0.0081) -0.0046 (0.0038) 0.0162 (0.0099) -0.0331 (0.0164) 0.0143 (0.0123) 0.0016 (0.0057) 0.0172 (0.0079) 
nkid_hhd 0.0138  (0.0090)  -0.0089 (0.0074) 0.0007 (0.0036) -0.0056 (0.0032) 0.0036 (0.0080) -0.0106 (0.0063) 0.0009 (0.0032) 0.0062 (0.0032) 
oth_hhd 0.0084  (0.0166)  -0.0110  (0.0122) -0.0044 (0.0054) 0.0070 (0.0099) 0.0045 (0.0136) 0.0020 (0.0114) -0.0015 (0.0049) -0.0050 (0.0040) 
s_kid0-2 -0.0022  (0.0083)  0.0023  (0.0067) -0.0011 (0.0034) 0.0010 (0.0031) -0.0464 (0.0162) 0.0331 (0.0118) -0.0013 (0.0066) 0.0146 (0.0065) 
s_kid3-6 -0.0053  (0.0071)  0.0118  (0.0054) -0.0025 (0.0031) -0.0040 (0.0032) -0.0395 (0.0093) 0.0216 (0.0072) 0.0115 (0.0031) 0.0064 (0.0045) 
s_kid7-15 0.0029  (0.0048)  -0.0003  (0.0038) -0.0009 (0.0017) -0.0017 (0.0021) -0.0134 (0.0048) 0.0039 (0.0038) 0.0037 (0.0016) 0.0057 (0.0019) 
unmarr -0.0059  (0.0093)  0.0022  (0.0072) 0.0011 (0.0037) 0.0025 (0.0042) 0.0094 (0.0101) -0.0026 (0.0086) -0.0028 (0.0038) -0.0041 (0.0035) 
sep_div  -0.0055 (0.0115) -0.0081 (0.0078) 0.0127 (0.0066) 0.0010 (0.0047) 0.0056 (0.0105) 0.0027 (0.0089) -0.0028 (0.0038) -0.0055 (0.0029) 
y_edu  0.0030 (0.0010) 0.0003 (0.0007) -0.0013 (0.0004) -0.0020 (0.0004) 0.0017 (0.0010) 0.0008 (0.0008) -0.0009 (0.0004) -0.0016 (0.0004) 
age 0.0141  (0.0033)  -0.0037  (0.0027) -0.0001 (0.0013) -0.0103 (0.0017) 0.0087 (0.0031) -0.0020 (0.0026) 0.0002 (0.0012) -0.0069 (0.0012) 
age_q -0.0002  (0.0000)  0.0001  (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) 
tenu 0.0077  (0.0018)  -0.0032  (0.0015) -0.0015 (0.0007) -0.0030 (0.0008) 0.0126 (0.0018) -0.0054 (0.0014) -0.0049 (0.0007) -0.0023 (0.0007) 
tenu_q -0.0003  (0.0001)  0.0001  (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0005 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) 
ln_incph 0.0315  (0.0083)  -0.0171  (0.0050) -0.0052 (0.0021) -0.0091 (0.0029) 0.0467 (0.0069) -0.0245 (0.0046) -0.0096 (0.0018) -0.0126 (0.0024) 
o_hhdinc  0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
do_hhdinc  0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
sick -0.1569  (0.0508)  0.0097  (0.0217) 0.0276 (0.0181) 0.1196 (0.0409) -0.0469 (0.0098) 0.0064 (0.0073) 0.0050 (0.0032) 0.0355 (0.0054) 
foreign n.a.  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a n.a n.a n.a  0.0161 (0.0083) -0.0137 (0.0070) -0.0018 (0.0033) -0.0005 (0.0030) 
st_alo5 -0.0294  (0.0107)  0.0114 (0.0079) 0.0049 (0.0043) 0.0131 (0.0053) -0.0261 (0.0097) -0.0001 (0.0067) 0.0186 (0.0048) 0.0076 (0.0041) 
lt_alo5 -0.0765  (0.0169)  0.0237  (0.0120) 0.0241 (0.0085) 0.0287 (0.0085) -0.0757 (0.0184) 0.0053 (0.0104) 0.0407 (0.0103) 0.0297 (0.0091) 
  regression parameters  regression parameters 
 
Wald chi2(63)   =   414.58 
Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R2       =     0.1403 
Log pseudolikelihood = -2079.8055 
Wald chi
2 (63)   =     931.08 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.1504 
Log pseudolikelihood =  -4305.742 
N 5903  10092 
(1) full-time⇒full-time, (2) full-time⇒part-time, (3) full-time⇒unemployment , (4) full-time⇒non-employment,  robust standard errors in parentheses. n.a. = not applicable. 





Table A-4.1b.: Marginal Effects of mlogit-regressions (full-time employment in tw,)  
 Ireland  Netherlands 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
si_hhd -0.1080 (0.0800)  0.0682  (0.2070) 0.0069 (0.5990) 0.0330 (0.2710) -0.0368 (0.0256) -0.0002 (0.0207) 0.0050 (0.0052) 0.0319 (0.0128) 
lopa_hhd 0.0204 (0.4450)  -0.0157  (0.4770) 0.0004 (0.9560) -0.0050 (0.6690) -0.0903 (0.0453) 0.0490 (0.0396) 0.0035 (0.0056) 0.0378 (0.0229) 
nkid_hhd 0.0133 (0.4940)  -0.0134  (0.3940) 0.0007 (0.9030) -0.0006 (0.9540) 0.0113 (0.0141) -0.0176 (0.0132) 0.0000 (0.0017) 0.0062 (0.0030) 
oth_hhd 0.0184 (0.4000)  -0.0196  (0.2580) 0.0140 (0.1370) -0.0129 (0.1150) -0.0327 (0.0421) 0.0273 (0.0393) 0.0038 (0.0050) 0.0016 (0.0073) 
s_kid0-2 -0.0860 (0.0000)  0.0587  (0.0000) 0.0039 (0.2430) 0.0234 (0.0000) -0.1115 (0.0166) 0.0942 (0.0156) 0.0035 (0.0015) 0.0138 (0.0029) 
s_kid3-6 -0.0091 (0.5380)  0.0135  (0.2680) -0.0060 (0.2240) 0.0016 (0.7910) -0.0293 (0.0187) 0.0217 (0.0175) 0.0015 (0.0017) 0.0061 (0.0033) 
s_kid7-15 -0.0274 (0.0000)  0.0172  (0.0080) 0.0011 (0.5810) 0.0091 (0.0040) -0.0104 (0.0087) 0.0066 (0.0083) 0.0014 (0.0008) 0.0023 (0.0017) 
unmarr 0.0738 (0.0000)  -0.0543  (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.9900) -0.0195 (0.0300) 0.0823 (0.0114) -0.0756 (0.0110) -0.0003 (0.0015) -0.0065 (0.0024) 
sep_div -0.0285 (0.4790)  0.0350  (0.3510) -0.0034 (0.5480) -0.0030 (0.8160) 0.0432 (0.0145) -0.0410 (0.0140) 0.0003 (0.0019) -0.0026 (0.0023) 
y_edu 0.0037 (0.0520)  -0.0011  (0.4770) -0.0001 (0.8190) -0.0025 (0.0110) 0.0002 (0.0027) 0.0007 (0.0026) -0.0003 (0.0003) -0.0007 (0.0006) 
age 0.0042 (0.5150)  -0.0001  (0.9850) 0.0031 (0.2040) -0.0071 (0.0070) 0.0173 (0.0051) -0.0136 (0.0050) 0.0001 (0.0007) -0.0038 (0.0008) 
age_q -0.0001 (0.3410)  0.0000  (0.7330) 0.0000 (0.2250) 0.0001 (0.0040) -0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
tenu 0.0128 (0.0000)  -0.0027  (0.3460) -0.0029 (0.0010) -0.0072 (0.0000) 0.0021 (0.0029) -0.0011 (0.0028) -0.0005 (0.0003) -0.0005 (0.0005) 
tenu_q -0.0005 (0.0050)  0.0000  (0.7850) 0.0001 (0.0100) 0.0003 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0002) 0.0000 (0.0002) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
ln_incph 0.0308 (0.0120)  -0.0070  (0.4710) -0.0067 (0.0020) -0.0171 (0.0000) 0.0095 (0.0108) -0.0035 (0.0104) -0.0013 (0.0009) -0.0048 (0.0013) 
o_hhdinc 0.0000 (0.0000)  0.0000  (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.2510) 0.0000 (0.0270) -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
do_hhdinc 0.0000 (0.0000)  0.0000  (0.0020) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
sick -0.2012 (0.0560)  0.0418  (0.5580) 0.0155 (0.5930) 0.1439 (0.0530) -0.1304 (0.0421) 0.0498 (0.0365) 0.0050 (0.0050) 0.0756 (0.0238) 
foreign -0.0039 (0.9290)  0.0093  (0.8050) 0.0018 (0.8860) -0.0072 (0.6770) 0.0370 (0.0276) -0.0387 (0.0256) 0.0011 (0.0044) 0.0006 (0.0039) 
st_alo5 0.0158 (0.4450)  -0.0077  (0.6770) -0.0016 (0.6980) -0.0064 (0.4180) -0.0095 (0.0145) 0.0018 (0.0135) 0.0028 (0.0019) 0.0049 (0.0036) 
lt_alo5 -0.0490 (0.0920)  0.0151  (0.5800) 0.0143 (0.1430) 0.0196 (0.1640) -0.0389 (0.0291) 0.0190 (0.0263) 0.0076 (0.0056) 0.0123 (0.0086) 
  regression parameters  regression parameters 
 
Wald chi
2 (63)   =     320.33 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.0976 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1641.9018 
Wald chi
2 (63)   =     778.73 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.1755 
Log pseudolikelihood = -2200.8833 
N 3168  4979 
(1) full-time ⇒ full-time, (2) full-time ⇒ part-time, (3) full-time ⇒ unemployment , (4) full-time ⇒ non-employment,  robust standard errors in parentheses. 





Table A-4.1c.: Marginal Effects of mlogit-regressions (full-time employment in tw,)  
 Portugal  UK 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
si_hhd 0.0044 (0.0121)  -0.0004  (0.0084) -0.0040 (0.0024) 0.0000 (0.0082) -0.0087 (0.0193) -0.0093 (0.0139) -0.0025 (0.0039) 0.0205 (0.0123) 
lopa_hhd 0.0094 (0.0087)  0.0050  (0.0068) -0.0009 (0.0021) -0.0135 (0.0049) 0.0026 (0.0165) -0.0037 (0.0135) 0.0037 (0.0051) -0.0026 (0.0080) 
nkid_hhd -0.0023 (0.0082)  -0.0015  (0.0050) -0.0014 (0.0022) 0.0052 (0.0058) -0.0164 (0.0115) 0.0024 (0.0092) 0.0018 (0.0036) 0.0122 (0.0058) 
oth_hhd 0.0069 (0.0061)  -0.0019  (0.0042) -0.0014 (0.0013) -0.0036 (0.0041) 0.0247 (0.0142) -0.0173 (0.0111) 0.0092 (0.0068) -0.0166 (0.0044) 
s_kid0-2 -0.0086 (0.0065)  0.0012  (0.0042) 0.0025 (0.0016) 0.0049 (0.0045) -0.0987 (0.0117) 0.0637 (0.0091) 0.0067 (0.0033) 0.0283 (0.0045) 
s_kid3-6 -0.0137 (0.0064)  0.0104  (0.0040) -0.0039 (0.0019) 0.0072 (0.0047) -0.0336 (0.0135) 0.0338 (0.0101) -0.0102 (0.0062) 0.0101 (0.0061) 
s_kid7-15 -0.0020 (0.0036)  -0.0009  (0.0026) 0.0015 (0.0008) 0.0013 (0.0025) -0.0205 (0.0062) 0.0125 (0.0050) 0.0013 (0.0015) 0.0067 (0.0032) 
unmarr -0.0033 (0.0084)  -0.0011  (0.0049) 0.0068 (0.0033) -0.0024 (0.0059) 0.0175 (0.0113) -0.0272 (0.0088) 0.0063 (0.0042) 0.0033 (0.0061) 
sep_div -0.0029 (0.0101)  -0.0049  (0.0054) 0.0020 (0.0030) 0.0058 (0.0082) 0.0082 (0.0116) -0.0100   (0.0096) 0.0081 (0.0047) -0.0063 (0.0046) 
y_edu 0.0002 (0.0005)  0.0008  (0.0003) 0.0000 (0.0001) -0.0010 (0.0004) 0.0009 (0.0012) -0.0003 (0.0001) -0.0007 (0.0003) 0.0001 (0.0005) 
age -0.0005 (0.0021)  0.0015  (0.0014) 0.0009 (0.0007) -0.0018 (0.0014) 0.0159 (0.0037) -0.0006 (0.0032) -0.0007 (0.0009) -0.0092 (0.0014) 
age_q 0.0000 (0.0000)  0.0000  (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0002 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000   (0.0000) 0.0001  (0.0000) 
tenu 0.0095 (0.0014)  -0.0024  (0.0010) -0.0024 (0.0004) -0.0047 (0.0010) 0.0048 (0.0023) -0.0026 (0.0019) -0.0010 (0.0007) -0.0013 (0.0010) 
tenu_q -0.0003 (0.0001)  0.0001  (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.0001) -0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0000   (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0001) 
ln_incph 0.0150 (0.0026)  -0.0066  (0.0017) -0.0011 (0.0006) -0.0072 (0.0017) 0.0531 (0.0008) -0.0366 (0.0061) -0.0049 (0.0014) -0.0116 (0.0029) 
o_hhdinc 0.0000 (0.0000)  0.0000  (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000   (0.0000) 
do_hhdinc 0.0000 (0.0000)  0.0000  (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000   (0.0000) 
sick -0.0345 (0.0101)  0.0022  (0.0053) 0.0045 (0.0031) 0.0278 (0.0079) -0.0567 (0.0168) -0.0044 (0.0116) 0.0146 (0.0066) 0.0465 (0.0116) 
foreign -0.0653 (0.0421)  -0.0063  (0.0158) -0.0089 (0.0012) 0.0805 (0.0396) 0.0307 (0.0222) -0.0359 (0.0161) 0.0126 (0.0123) -0.0074 (0.0097) 
st_alo5 0.0000 (0.0087)  -0.0076  (0.0050) 0.0030 (0.0025) 0.0045 (0.0065) -0.0130 (0.0120) 0.0124 (0.0101) 0.0013 (0.0033) -0.0007 (0.0055) 
lt_alo5 -0.0157 (0.0092)  -0.0058  (0.0049) 0.0074 (0.0028) 0.0141 (0.0066) -0.0263 (0.0246) 0.0050 (0.0198) 0.0047 (0.0060) 0.0165 (0.0138) 
  regression parameters  regression parameters 
 
Wald chi
2 (63)   =   414.58 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.1403 
Log pseudolikelihood = -2079.8055 
Wald chi
2 (63)   =     519.00 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.0704 
Log pseudolikelihood = -3418.1526 
N 5903  7484 
(1) full-time ⇒ full-time, (2) full-time ⇒ part-time, (3) full-time ⇒ unemployment , (4) full-time ⇒ non-employment,  robust standard errors in parentheses. 





Table A-4.2a.: Marginal Effects of mlogit-regressions (part-time employment in tw,)  
 Denmark  Germany 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
si_hhd 0.0291 (0.0667)  -0.0031  (0.0659) -0.0201 (0.0053) -0.0059 (0.0024) -0.1020 (0.0642) 0.0278 (0.0469) 0.0355 (0.0303) 0.0387 (0.0336) 
lopa_hhd 0.0237 (0.0727)  -0.0032  (0.0729) 0.0046 (0.0073) -0.0251 (0.0046) 0.0000 (0.0414) 0.0018 (0.0358) 0.0152 (0.0153) -0.0170 (0.0128) 
nkid_hhd -0.0182 (0.0407)  0.0208  (0.0406) 0.0010 (0.0021) -0.0036 (0.0030) 0.0059 (0.0227) -0.0134 (0.0207) 0.0048 (0.0058) 0.0027 (0.0096) 
oth_hhd 0.0967 (0.0416)  -0.1132  (0.0419) 0.0033 (0.0062) 0.0132 (0.0138) -0.0373 (0.0461) 0.0121 (0.0402) 0.0182 (0.0166) 0.0070 (0.0164) 
s_kid0-2 0.0353 (0.0361)  -0.0337  (0.0358) -0.0004 (0.0020) -0.0012 (0.0038) 0.0271 (0.0317) -0.0256 (0.0288) -0.0078 (0.0089) 0.0062 (0.0127) 
s_kid3-6 -0.0251 (0.0342)  0.0242  (0.0337) -0.0007 (0.0015) 0.0016 (0.0033) 0.0865 (0.0249) -0.1031 (0.0236) -0.0011 (0.0048) 0.0177 (0.0091) 
s_kid7-15 0.0327 (0.0175)  -0.0278  (0.0173) -0.0009 (0.0011) -0.0040 (0.0023) 0.0197 (0.0119) -0.0276 (0.0112) -0.0019 (0.0022) 0.0098 (0.0049) 
unmarr -0.0212 (0.0470)  0.0112  (0.0461) 0.0055 (0.0044) 0.0045 (0.0066) -0.0541 (0.0429) 0.0475 (0.0397) -0.0014 (0.0052) 0.0079 (0.0223) 
sep_div -0.0869 (0.0803)  0.0859  (0.0795) -0.0027 (0.0015) 0.0037 (0.0080) -0.0962 (0.0468) 0.0986 (0.0440) -0.0073 (0.0037) 0.0048 (0.0161) 
y_edu -0.0062 (0.0034)  0.0065  (0.0034) -0.0003 (0.0003) 0.0000 (0.0003) -0.0046 (0.0036) 0.0051 (0.0033) 0.0009 (0.0006) -0.0014 (0.0014) 
age -0.0075 (0.0144)  0.0117  (0.0143) 0.0006 (0.0007) -0.0048 (0.0014) 0.0023 (0.0098) 0.0096 (0.0091) 0.0039 (0.0019) -0.0159 (0.0035) 
age_q 0.0001 (0.0002)  -0.0002  (0.0002) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0001) -0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.0000) 
tenu 0.0166 (0.0080)  -0.0145  (0.0080) -0.0012 (0.0004) -0.0010 (0.0000) 0.0148 (0.0049) -0.0074 (0.0045) -0.0029 (0.0012) -0.0046 (0.0020) 
tenu_q -0.0005 (0.0004)  0.0004  (0.0004) 0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0007 (0.0003) 0.0004 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0001) 
ln_incph 0.0148 (0.0276)  -0.0104  (0.0275) 0.0003 (0.0012) -0.0047 (0.0021) 0.0115 (0.0191) 0.0277 (0.0182) -0.0128 (0.0033) -0.0264 (0.0060) 
o_hhdinc 0.0000 (0.0000)  0.0000  (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
do_hhdinc 0.0000 (0.0000)  0.0000  (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
sick 0.0888 (0.0483)  -0.0850  (0.0479) -0.0021 (0.0015) -0.0017 (0.0043) 0.0049 (0.0217) -0.0317 (0.0192) 0.0006 (0.0045) 0.0262 (0.0110) 
foreign 0.0111 (0.1093)  -0.0043  (0.1056) 0.0055 (0.0083) -0.0123 (0.0023) -0.0562 (0.0314) 0.0235 (0.0291) 0.0205 (0.0090) 0.0123 (0.0113) 
st_alo5 0.0264 (0.0346)  -0.0259  (0.0343) -0.0006 (0.0018) 0.0000 (0.0037) -0.0574 (0.0302) 0.0549 (0.0280) 0.0138 (0.0074) -0.0114 (0.0091) 
lt_alo5 0.0183 (0.0425)  -0.0222  (0.0413) 0.0027 (0.0026) 0.0011 (0.0047) 0.0033 (0.0412) -0.0214 (0.0364) 0.0128 (0.0093) 0.0053 (0.0186) 
  regression parameters  regression parameters 
 
Wald chi
2 (63)   =   28692.55 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.1120 
Log pseudolikelihood = -828.15473 
Wald chi
2 (63)   =     419.08 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.0974 
Log pseudolikelihood =   -1924.91 
N 1163  2915 
(1) part-time ⇒ part-time, (2) part-time ⇒ full-time, (3) part-time ⇒ unemployment , (4) part-time ⇒ non-employment,  robust standard errors in parentheses. 





Table A-4.2b.: Marginal Effects of mlogit-regressions (part-time employment in tw,)  
 Ireland  Netherlands 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
si_hhd -0.0146 (0.8600)  -0.0302  (0.5980) -0.0005 (0.0010) 0.0453 (0.5380) 0.0055 (0.0243) -0.0216 (0.0176) 0.0001 (0.0030) 0.0160 (0.0160) 
lopa_hhd -0.0145 (0.8080)  -0.0260  (0.6080) 0.0000 (0.7620) 0.0405 (0.3140) 0.0373 (0.0173) -0.0282 (0.0153) -0.0018 (0.0015) -0.0073 (0.0081) 
nkid_hhd 0.0856 (0.0070)  -0.0709  (0.0150) -0.0029 (0.0010) -0.0119 (0.5290) 0.0067 (0.0134) -0.0096 (0.0123) -0.0004 (0.0018) 0.0033 (0.0053) 
Oth_hhd 0.0319 (0.4260)  -0.0463  (0.1540) -0.0001 (0.0250) 0.0144 (0.5840) -0.0744 (0.0398) 0.0823 (0.0397) 0.0008 (0.0044) -0.0087 (0.0077) 
s_kid0-2 0.0080 (0.7590)  -0.0484  (0.0550) 0.0001 (0.0950) 0.0402 (0.0010) 0.0622 (0.0153) -0.0573 (0.0148) -0.0012 (0.0015) -0.0037 (0.0040) 
s_kid3-6 0.0333 (0.1770)  -0.0544  (0.0190) 0.0000 (0.3470) 0.0210 (0.0710) 0.0388 (0.0123) -0.0415 (0.0118) 0.0001 (0.0014) 0.0026 (0.0036) 
s_kid7-15 0.0099 (0.4480)  -0.0179  (0.1220) 0.0000 (0.6470) 0.0080 (0.2350) 0.0145 (0.0069) -0.0162 (0.0065) -0.0001 (0.0009) 0.0018 (0.0022) 
unmarr 0.0379 (0.3930)  -0.0064  (0.8810) 0.0001 (0.7080) -0.0315 (0.0720) -0.0466 (0.0203) 0.0498 (0.0194) 0.0022 (0.0039) -0.0054 (0.0045) 
Sep_div 0.0057 (0.9250)  -0.0113  (0.8450) 0.0001 (0.6040) 0.0056 (0.8500) -0.0047 (0.0207) 0.0090 (0.0194) 0.0009 (0.0025) -0.0051 (0.0064) 
y_edu 0.0082 (0.0400)  -0.0036  (0.3220) 0.0000 (0.0050) -0.0046 (0.0360) -0.0087 (0.0030) 0.0100 (0.0027) -0.0005 (0.0005) -0.0008 (0.0010) 
Age 0.0249 (0.0620)  -0.0011  (0.9350) 0.0000 (0.4790) -0.0238 (0.0000) 0.0077 (0.0057) 0.0033 (0.0053) 0.0001 (0.0007) -0.0111 (0.0018) 
Age_q -0.0003 (0.0770)  0.0000  (0.9210) 0.0000 (0.5350) 0.0003 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) 
tenu 0.0153 (0.0180)  -0.0049  (0.4020) 0.0000 (0.0080) -0.0104 (0.0040) 0.0152 (0.0027) -0.0109 (0.0025) -0.0010 (0.0004) -0.0033 (0.0009) 
tenu_q -0.0007 (0.0540)  0.0003  (0.3600) 0.0000 (0.0110) 0.0004 (0.0560) -0.0006 (0.0001) 0.0004 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) 
ln_incph -0.0107 (0.6490)  0.0403  (0.0650) 0.0000 (0.3930) -0.0296 (0.0040) -0.0083 (0.0112) 0.0272 (0.0111) -0.0036 (0.0010) -0.0153 (0.0027) 
o_hhdinc 0.0000 (0.4540)  0.0000  (0.2970) 0.0000 (0.0800) 0.0000 (0.6450) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
do_hhdinc 0.0000 (0.7960)  0.0000  (0.3370) 0.0000 (0.0090) 0.0000 (0.0010) 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
Sick -0.3459 (0.1310)  0.2355  (0.3060) -0.0002 (0.0020) 0.1106 (0.3590) -0.2047 (0.0521) 0.0347 (0.0330) 0.0162 (0.0110) 0.1539 (0.0430) 
foreign 0.0176 (0.8100)  -0.0395  (0.5260) 0.0000 (0.8420) 0.0218 (0.6030) -0.1090 (0.0610) 0.0944 (0.0574) 0.0109 (0.0162) 0.0036 (0.0140) 
st_alo5 -0.0392 (0.3570)  0.0110  (0.7850) 0.0003 (0.1560) 0.0278 (0.2190) -0.0008 (0.0134) -0.0034 (0.0123) 0.0037 (0.0030) 0.0006 (0.0049) 
lt_alo5 -0.0950 (0.1150)  0.0668  (0.2530) 0.0010 (0.0480) 0.0271 (0.3190) -0.0047 (0.0195) 0.0008 (0.0180) -0.0007 (0.0020) 0.0046 (0.0073) 
  regression parameters  regression parameters 
 
Wald chi
2 (63)   =    25488.86 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.0768 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1223.6263 
Wald chi2 (63)   =     588.54 
Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R2       =     0.1368 
Log pseudolikelihood = -2049.5534 
N 1660  4454 
(1) part-time ⇒ part-time, (2) part-time ⇒ full-time, (3) part-time ⇒ unemployment , (4) part-time ⇒ non-employment,  robust standard errors in parentheses. 





Table A-4.2c.: Marginal Effects of mlogit-regressions (part-time employment in tw,)  
 UK 
                 (1)                  (2)                (3)                  (4) 
si_hhd 0.0684  (0.0308) -0.0469 (0.0271) 0.0008 (0.0080) -0.0223 (0.0133) 
lopa_hhd 0.0333  (0.0298) -0.0239 (0.0227) 0.0016 (0.0077) -0.0110 (0.0157) 
nkid_hhd -0.0166  (0.0258) 0.0147 (0.0230) 0.0022 (0.0053) -0.0002 (0.0124) 
Oth_hhd 0.0215  (0.0393) -0.0167 (0.0296) 0.0189 (0.0169) -0.0237 (0.0154) 
s_kid0-2 0.0495  (0.0219) -0.0702 (0.0192) 0.0024 (0.0045) 0.0184 (0.0110) 
s_kid3-6 0.0409  (0.0173) -0.0431 (0.0144) -0.0051 (0.0054) 0.0072 (0.0105) 
s_kid7-15 -0.0028  (0.0104) -0.0062 (0.0084) 0.0012 (0.0023) 0.0078 (0.0065) 
unmarr -0.0773  (0.0440) 0.0971 (0.0396) -0.0006 (0.0069) -0.0191 (0.0159) 
Sep_div -0.0370  (0.0283) 0.0139 (0.0230) 0.0029 (0.0063) 0.0202 (0.0167) 
y_edu 0.0009  (0.0024) -0.0021 (0.0021) -0.0008 (0.0006) 0.0020 (0.0013) 
Age 0.0003  (0.0081) 0.0246 (0.0073) -0.0017 (0.0017) -0.0232 (0.0040) 
Age_q 0.0000  (0.0001) -0.0003 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0003 (0.0000) 
tenu 0.0186  (0.0046) -0.0101 (0.0040) -0.0017 (0.0009) -0.0068 (0.0025) 
tenu_q -0.0007  (0.0003) 0.0003 (0.0003) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0001) 
ln_incph -0.0355  (0.0168) 0.0586 (0.0156) -0.0031 (0.0022) -0.0200 (0.0084) 
o_hhdinc 0.0000  (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
do_hhdinc 0.0000  (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
Sick -0.1551  (0.0375) 0.0697 (0.0313) 0.0120 (0.0085) 0.0735 (0.0238) 
foreign -0.0513  (0.0691) 0.0581 (0.0600) 0.0216 (0.0319) -0.0283 (0.0279) 
st_alo5 -0.0239  (0.0239) 0.0239 (0.0211) -0.0005 (0.0052) 0.0005 (0.0135) 
lt_alo5 -0.0859  (0.0516) 0.0337 (0.0411) 0.0153 (0.0144) 0.0368 (0.0279) 
  regression parameters 
 
Wald chi
2 (63)   =     308.33 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.0669 
Log pseudolikelihood = -2224.8375 
N  3347 
(1) part-time ⇒ part-time, (2) part-time ⇒ full-time, (3) part-time ⇒ unemployment , (4) part-time ⇒ non-employment,  robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Table A-4.3a.: Marginal Effects of mlogit-regressions (unemployment in tw,)  
 
 Denmark  Germany 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
si_hhd 0.0911 (0.1308)  -0.1827  (0.1035) -0.0841 (0.0223) 0.1757 (0.1575) 0.1412 (0.0948) -0.1579 (0.0266) 0.0514 (0.0849) -0.0346 (0.0708) 
lopa_hhd 0.2503 (0.1246)  -0.1779  (0.0863) -0.0260 (0.0362) -0.0464 (0.1036) 0.0470 (0.0638) -0.1038 (0.0388) 0.0727 (0.0628) -0.0160 (0.0553) 
nkid_hhd -0.0741 (0.0809)  -0.0973  (0.0850) 0.0164 (0.0369) 0.1550 (0.0962) 0.0372 (0.0464) -0.0734 (0.0323) -0.0059 (0.0359) 0.0421 (0.0421) 
oth_hhd 0.1818 (0.2535)  0.1022  (0.2625) -0.1424 (0.0214) -0.1416 (0.1120) 0.0427 (0.0660) -0.0507 (0.0513) -0.0759 (0.0432) 0.0840 (0.0639) 
s_kid0-2 -0.1749 (0.0659)  0.0764  (0.0759) 0.0119 (0.0313) 0.0865 (0.0740) -0.0424 (0.0598) -0.0658 (0.0415) 0.0402 (0.0528) 0.0679 (0.0666) 
s_kid3-6 0.0349 (0.0644)  -0.0394  (0.0576) -0.0284 (0.0275) 0.0329 (0.0591) 0.0061 (0.0417) -0.0029 (0.0338) 0.0185 (0.0293) -0.0217 (0.0410) 
s_kid7-15 -0.0674 (0.0420)  -0.0036  (0.0346) -0.0072 (0.0189) 0.0783 (0.0390) -0.0401 (0.0217) -0.0347 (0.0183) 0.0092 (0.0171) 0.0657 (0.0196) 
unmarr -0.0004 (0.0753)  -0.1599  (0.0679) 0.0369 (0.0390) 0.1234 (0.0809) -0.0174 (0.0618) 0.0187 (0.0535) -0.0529 (0.0386) 0.0516 (0.0639) 
sep_div -0.1302 (0.0693)  -0.1224  (0.0741) -0.0094 (0.0348) 0.2619 (0.0937) 0.0083 (0.0538) -0.0269 (0.0462) -0.0610 (0.0388) 0.0796 (0.0562) 
y_edu 0.0072 (0.0066)  0.0043  (0.0064) -0.0031 (0.0034) -0.0084 (0.0067) -0.0072 (0.0059) 0.0116 (0.0051) 0.0010 (0.0048) -0.0054 (0.0063) 
age -0.0021 (0.0252)  0.0702  (0.0285) 0.0273 (0.0122) -0.0954 (0.0254) 0.0646 (0.0185) 0.0219 (0.0133) -0.0095 (0.0145) -0.0770 (0.0147) 
age_q 0.0001 (0.0003)  -0.0010  (0.0003) -0.0003 (0.0002) 0.0012 (0.0003) -0.0008 (0.0002) -0.0003 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0002) 0.0010 (0.0002) 
o_hhdinc 0.0002 (0.0001)  -0.0003  (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0002 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) 
do_hhdinc 0.0004 (0.0001)  -0.0006 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0003 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0000) -0.0003 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.0000) 
sick -0.0650 (0.1180)  -0.0249  (0.1355) -0.0204 (0.0477) 0.1102 (0.1378) -0.0187 (0.0368) -0.0716 (0.0280) -0.0241 (0.0295) 0.1143 (0.0368) 
foreign -0.0405 (0.1083)  -0.1987  (0.1034) 0.0383 (0.0758) 0.2009 (0.1707) -0.0711 (0.0462) -0.0825 (0.0317) -0.0491 (0.0336) 0.2028 (0.0524) 
st_alo5 -0.0173 (0.0784)  -0.0270 (0.0703) 0.0104 (0.0344) 0.0339 (0.0731) 0.1554 (0.0400) -0.0658 (0.0260) -0.0396 (0.0260) -0.0499 (0.0317) 
lt_alo5 0.1573 (0.0641)  -0.1219  (0.0652) -0.0403 (0.0318) 0.0050 (0.0625) 0.2097 (0.0402) -0.0785 (0.0251) -0.0978 (0.0260) -0.0335 (0.0319) 
  regression parameters  regression parameters 
 
Wald chi
2 (54)   =    7569.98 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.2029 
Log pseudolikelihood =  -504.9272 
Wald chi
2 (54)   =     291.00 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.1249 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1627.7969 
N 475  1377 
(1) unemployment ⇒ unemployment (2) unemployment ⇒ full-time, (3) unemployment ⇒ part-time, (4) unemployment ⇒ non-employment,  robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 





Table A-4.3b.: Marginal Effects of mlogit-regressions (unemployment in tw,) 
 
 Ireland  Netherlands 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
si_hhd 0.1189 (0.3200)  -0.0304  (0.5020) -0.0546 (0.5650) -0.0339 (0.7980) 0.1628 (0.1133) 0.0087 (0.0241) -0.0776 (0.0864) -0.0938 (0.1048) 
lopa_hhd 0.0944 (0.2820)  -0.0548  (0.1210) 0.0292 (0.7720) -0.0688 (0.5280) 0.1193 (0.0993) -0.0081 (0.0136) -0.0400 (0.0831) -0.0712 (0.0926) 
nkid_hhd 0.1333 (0.2810)  -0.0272  (0.5300) -0.0522 (0.5120) -0.0539 (0.6250) 0.0723 (0.0629) 0.0225 (0.0234) -0.0829 (0.0583) -0.0119 (0.0663) 
oth_hhd -0.0638 (0.3070)  0.0633  (0.3730) -0.0816 (0.2440) 0.0821 (0.4450) -0.0887 (0.0670) -0.0023 (0.0193) 0.0459 (0.1275) 0.0451 (0.1252) 
s_kid0-2 -0.0147 (0.8330)  -0.0598  (0.1930) -0.0303 (0.5850) 0.1048 (0.1750) -0.0494 (0.0587) -0.0268 (0.0170) 0.0365 (0.0577) 0.0397 (0.0677) 
s_kid3-6 -0.0226 (0.6980)  -0.0283  (0.3570) -0.0419 (0.3390) 0.0928 (0.1730) -0.0454 (0.0465) 0.0092 (0.0135) -0.0179 (0.0486) 0.0541 (0.0558) 
s_kid7-15 0.0193 (0.4570)  -0.0231  (0.1460) 0.0060 (0.7890) -0.0022 (0.9360) 0.0698 (0.0225) -0.0084 (0.0072) 0.0438 (0.0253) -0.1051 (0.0273) 
unmarr 0.0929 (0.3170)  0.0384  (0.4730) -0.0677 (0.3970) -0.0636 (0.5590) 0.0888 (0.0761) -0.0070 (0.0103) -0.0331 (0.0704) -0.0486 (0.0850) 
sep_div -0.0088 (0.9190)  0.0726  (0.5250) -0.1162 (0.0930) 0.0524 (0.6810) -0.0347 (0.0716) -0.0164 (0.0104) -0.1118 (0.0669) 0.1629 (0.0889) 
y_edu -0.0104 (0.2370)  0.0079  (0.0360) -0.0191 (0.0140) 0.0215 (0.0220) 0.0052 (0.0124) 0.0034 (0.0031) -0.0043 (0.0152) -0.0043 (0.0164) 
age 0.0205 (0.3720)  0.0232  (0.1330) -0.0280 (0.2030) -0.0158 (0.5760) 0.0385 (0.0218) 0.0060 (0.0053) -0.0287 (0.0256) -0.0158 (0.0265) 
age_q -0.0002 (0.3570)  -0.0004  (0.0690) 0.0003 (0.2190) 0.0003 (0.3610) -0.0004 (0.0003) -0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0003) 0.0002 (0.0003) 
o_hhdinc 0.0000 (0.4680)  0.0000  (0.4510) 0.0000 (0.7170) 0.0000 (0.8420) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
do_hhdinc 0.0001 (0.0190)  0.0000  (0.0430) 0.0000 (0.5470) 0.0000 (0.9660) 0.0002 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 
sick -0.2565 (0.0000)  -0.0954  (0.0000) -0.2402 (0.0000) 0.5920 (0.0000) -0.1000 (0.0745) 0.0022 (0.0158) -0.0076 (0.0896) 0.1054 (0.0941) 
foreign -0.0524 (0.6850)  0.0131  (0.8850) 0.0666 (0.6740) -0.0274 (0.8890) 0.2790 (0.1283) 0.0006 (0.0158) 0.0175 (0.1245) -0.2971 (0.0809) 
st_alo5 0.0267 (0.6990)  0.0004  (0.9910) 0.1341 (0.1000) -0.1613 (0.0460) 0.1504 (0.0852) 0.0221 (0.0244) -0.0647 (0.0682) -0.1079 (0.0829) 
lt_alo5 0.0704 (0.2180)  0.0160  (0.6680) -0.0096 (0.8870) -0.0768 (0.2650) -0.0876 (0.0682) 0.0937 (0.0527) 0.1160 (0.0883) -0.1221 (0.0748) 
  regression parameters  regression parameters 
 
Wald chi
2 (54)   =     174.67 
Prob > chi
2     =     . 
Pseudo R
2       =     . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -504.25186 
Wald chi
2 (54)   =     174.67 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.1565 
Log pseudolikelihood = -844.04931 
N 415  775 
(1) unemployment ⇒ unemployment (2) unemployment ⇒ full-time, (3) unemployment ⇒ part-time, (4) unemployment ⇒ non-employment,  robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 





Table A-4.3c.: Marginal Effects of mlogit-regressions (unemployment in tw,)  
 
 Portugal  UK 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
si_hhd -.00471 (0.0853)  -0.0228  (0.0817) 0.0352 (0.0448) 0.0348 (0.0894) 0.1831 (0.1254) -0.0578 (0.0705) -0.0744 (0.0822) -0.0508 (0.1208) 
lopa_hhd -0.0200 (0.0689)  -0.0647  (0.0755) -0.0441 (0.0178) 0.1288 (0.0816) 0.1221 (0.1046) -0.0971 (0.0555) -0.1154 (0.0598) 0.0904 (0.1032) 
nkid_hhd 0.0064 (0.0514)  0.0571  (0.0530) -0.0029 (0.0220) -0.0606 (0.0551) 0.1374 (0.1037) -0.0378 (0.0590) -0.0450 (0.0704) -0.0545 (0.0908) 
oth_hhd -0.0501 (0.0561)  -0.0259  (0.0461) 0.0250 (0.0185) 0.0510 (0.0584) 0.0232 (0.1078) 0.0367 (0.0762) -0.2007 (0.0455) 0.1408 (0.1129) 
s_kid0-2 -0.0865 (0.0500)  -0.0769  (0.0488) 0.0028 (0.0191) 0.1606 (0.0499) 0.0109 (0.0990) -0.1720 (0.0937) 0.1013 (0.0573) 0.0598 (0.0914) 
s_kid3-6 0.0388 (0.0281)  -0.0332  (0.0275) -0.0118 (0.0108) 0.0062 (0.0260) -0.0598 (0.0648) -0.0720 (0.0651) 0.0422 (0.0706) 0.0897 (0.0668) 
s_kid7-15 -0.0482 (0.0625)  -0.0078  (0.0537) 0.0338 (0.0351) 0.0222 (0.0721) -0.1420 (0.0542) 0.0160 (0.0334) 0.0488 (0.0460) 0.0772 (0.0540) 
unmarr 0.1138 (0.0800)  0.0092  (0.0719) -0.0072 (0.0298) -0.1157 (0.0680) 0.0446 (0.0689) 0.0690 (0.0721) -0.0042 (0.0710) -0.1094 (0.0817) 
sep_div -0.0046 (0.0040)  0.0041  (0.0044) 0.0016 (0.0022) -0.0012 (0.0048) 0.0375 (0.0637) 0.0621 (0.0639) 0.0487 (0.0647) -0.1484 (0.0671) 
y_edu -0.0160 (0.0193)  0.0070  (0.0198) 0.0172 (0.0083) -0.0082 (0.0192) -0.0098 (0.0078) 0.0050 (0.0073) -0.0084 (0.0079) 0.0132 (0.0096) 
age 0.0002 (0.0002)  -0.0003  (0.0003) -0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0002) 0.0274 (0.0217) 0.0139 (0.0195) 0.0118 (0.0231) -0.0531 (0.0260) 
age_q 0.0001 (0.0000)  0.0000  (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0004 (0.0003) -0.0002 (0.0002) -0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0007 (0.0003) 
o_hhdinc 0.0001 (0.0001)  -0.0003  (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) 
do_hhdinc -0.0304 (0.0514)  0.0358  (0.0604) -0.0353 (0.0166) 0.0299 (0.0530) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) 
sick 0.1024 (0.0661)  0.0384  (0.0590) 0.0239 (0.0283) -0.1647 (0.0535) -0.1183 (0.0448) -0.0699 (0.0481) -0.0281 (0.0586) 0.2163 (0.0737) 
foreign 0.1031 (0.0457)  -0.0611  (0.0423) -0.0321 (0.0180) -0.0098 (0.0453) -0.1012 (0.0750) 0.4073 (0.1775) -0.0854 (0.1059) -0.2207 (0.1134) 
st_alo5 -0.0471 (0.0853)  -0.0228  (0.0817) 0.0352 (0.0448) 0.0348 (0.0894) -0.0961 (0.0431) 0.0336 (0.0563) 0.0620 (0.0609) 0.0005 (0.0717) 
lt_alo5 -0.0200 (0.0689)  -0.0647  (0.0755) -0.0441 (0.0178) 0.1288 (0.0816) 0.0388 (0.0537) -0.0432 (0.0502) -0.0731 (0.0564) 0.0775 (0.0667) 
  regression parameters  regression parameters 
 
Wald chi
2 (48)   =     190.26 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.0967 
Log pseudolikelihood =  -725.7741 
Wald chi
2 (54)   =     114.14 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.1013 
Log pseudolikelihood = -501.64232 
N 639  417 
(1) unemployment ⇒ unemployment (2) unemployment ⇒ full-time, (3) unemployment ⇒ part-time, (4) unemployment ⇒ non-employment,  robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 





Table A-4.4a.: Marginal Effects of mlogit-regressions (non-employment in tw,)  
 
 Denmark  Germany 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
si_hhd  0.0073 (0.0450) -0.0177 (0.0074) 0.0071 (0.0352) 0.0033 (0.0220) 0.0304 (0.0191) -0.0068 (0.0019) -0.0174 (0.0156) -0.0062 (0.0087) 
lopa_hhd  0.0429 (0.0313) -0.0067 (0.0081) -0.0485 (0.0177) 0.0123 (0.0213) 0.0120 (0.0221) -0.0064 (0.0016) -0.0185 (0.0154) 0.0129 (0.0141) 
nkid_hhd  0.0031 (0.0341) -0.0131 (0.0082) 0.0205 (0.0260) -0.0105 (0.0153) 0.0305 (0.0129) 0.0027 (0.0025) -0.0274 (0.0109) -0.0057 (0.0057) 
oth_hhd  0.0876 (0.0250) -0.0158 (0.0063) -0.0411 (0.0227) -0.0307 (0.0106) -0.0357 (0.0238) 0.0071 (0.0061) 0.0178 (0.0187) 0.0109 (0.0104) 
s_kid0-2  0.0012 (0.0211) -0.0033 (0.0045) 0.0023 (0.0157) -0.0002 (0.0096) 0.0422 (0.0091) -0.0070 (0.0023) -0.0195 (0.0074) -0.0157 (0.0042) 
s_kid3-6  0.0257 (0.0233) -0.0022 (0.0042) -0.0234 (0.0197) -0.0001 (0.0094) 0.0129 (0.0087) -0.0044 (0.0019) -0.0034 (0.0072) -0.0051 (0.0040) 
s_kid7-15  0.0038 (0.0140) -0.0026 (0.0033) 0.0067 (0.0111) -0.0080 (0.0067) -0.0050 (0.0050) -0.0008 (0.0010) 0.0040 (0.0040) 0.0018 (0.0020) 
unmarr  0.0269 (0.0236) -0.0041 (0.0055) -0.0221 (0.0161) -0.0007 (0.0127) -0.0002 (0.0201) 0.0064 (0.0047) -0.0146 (0.0146) 0.0085 (0.0105) 
sep_div  -0.0411 (0.0361) 0.0079 (0.0093) 0.0145 (0.0289) 0.0187 (0.0189) -0.0289 (0.0238) 0.0108 (0.0060) 0.0167 (0.0192) 0.0014 (0.0096) 
y_edu  -0.0062 (0.0026) 0.0008 (0.0007) 0.0036 (0.0019) 0.0018 (0.0013) -0.0040 (0.0017) 0.0007 (0.0003) 0.0021 (0.0014) 0.0013 (0.0007) 
age  -0.0088 (0.0077) 0.0074 (0.0028) -0.0072 (0.0057) 0.0086 (0.0039) -0.0138 (0.0037) 0.0021 (0.0006) 0.0045 (0.0031) 0.0071 (0.0015) 
age_q  0.0002 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) 
o_hhdinc  0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
do_hhdinc  0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
sick  0.0835 (0.0193) -0.0243 (0.0076) -0.0275 (0.0152) -0.0317 (0.0090) 0.0313 (0.0090) -0.0038 (0.0016) -0.0334 (0.0073) 0.0059 (0.0042) 
foreign  0.0406 (0.0356) -0.0167 (0.0070) -0.0530 (0.0173) 0.0292 (0.0264) 0.0311 (0.0096) -0.0045 (0.0016) -0.0301 (0.0074) 0.0035 (0.0049) 
st_alo5  -0.0432 (0.0301) 0.0000 (0.0057) 0.0102 (0.0214) 0.0331 (0.0187) -0.0408 (0.0180) 0.0054 (0.0027) -0.0077 (0.0104) 0.0432 (0.0130) 
lt_alo5  -0.0498 (0.0278) 0.0005 (0.0056) -0.0105 (0.0179) 0.0599 (0.0201) -0.0201 (0.0169) 0.0064 (0.0037) -0.0304 (0.0098) 0.0440 (0.0110) 
  regression parameters  regression parameters 
 
Wald chi
2 (54)   =     329.71 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.2534 
Log pseudolikelihood =   -1063.58 
Wald chi
2 (54)   =     724.44 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.1380 
Log pseudolikelihood = -3780.0244 
N 1710  7198 
(1) non-employment ⇒ non-employment, (2) non-employment ⇒ full-time, (3) non-employment ⇒ part-time, (4) non-employment ⇒ unemployment,  
      robust standard errors in parentheses. 





Table A-4.4b.: Marginal Effects of mlogit-regressions (non-employment in tw,)  
 
 Ireland  Netherlands 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
si_hhd  0.0207 (0.5540) 0.0001 (0.9940) -0.0349 (0.1140) 0.0141 (0.5180) 0.0313 (0.0160) -0.0210 (0.0123) -0.0089 (0.0092) 0.0507 (0.0187) 
lopa_hhd  -0.0004 (0.9860) -0.0012 (0.8760) 0.0049 (0.7830) -0.0033 (0.6490) 0.0058 (0.0173) -0.0112 (0.0116) 0.0075 (0.0111) 0.0353 (0.0173) 
nkid_hhd  -0.0107 (0.6230) 0.0061 (0.5320) -0.0117 (0.4380) 0.0163 (0.1770) 0.0379 (0.0113) -0.0253 (0.0085) -0.0125 (0.0066) 0.0153 (0.0158) 
Oth_hhd  0.0032 (0.8450) -0.0052 (0.3320) 0.0032 (0.8130) -0.0013 (0.8760) 0.0406 (0.0142) -0.0222 (0.0121) -0.0163 (0.0070) 0.0029 (0.0171) 
s_kid0-2  0.0280 (0.0080) -0.0106 (0.0130) -0.0117 (0.1660) -0.0057 (0.2110) 0.0497 (0.0096) -0.0180 (0.0067) -0.0294 (0.0064) 0.0039 (0.0192) 
s_kid3-6  0.0165 (0.0690) -0.0064 (0.0770) -0.0073 (0.2980) -0.0028 (0.4840) 0.0055 (0.0072) 0.0004 (0.0053) -0.0056 (0.0042) 0.0039 (0.0169) 
s_kid7-15  0.0006 (0.8930) -0.0002 (0.9390) -0.0015 (0.6590) 0.0010 (0.5240) 0.0088 (0.0042) -0.0051 (0.0032) -0.0028 (0.0024) 0.0195 (0.0098) 
unmarr  0.0206 (0.2680) -0.0014 (0.8550) -0.0141 (0.3220) -0.0051 (0.4510) 0.0060 (0.0163) -0.0114 (0.0109) 0.0050 (0.0105) 0.0601 (0.0179) 
Sep_div  -0.0491 (0.1290) -0.0052 (0.5070) 0.0394 (0.1460) 0.0148 (0.3120) -0.0112 (0.0185) -0.0012 (0.0131) 0.0097 (0.0109) 0.0092 (0.0296) 
y_edu  -0.0039 (0.0330) 0.0019 (0.0000) 0.0014 (0.3210) 0.0006 (0.5060) -0.0109 (0.0030) 0.0068 (0.0023) 0.0041 (0.0017) -0.0029 (0.0015) 
Age  -0.0192 (0.0000) 0.0020 (0.2490) 0.0136 (0.0000) 0.0036 (0.0470) -0.0240 (0.0037) 0.0130 (0.0028) 0.0103 (0.0021) 0.0006 (0.0052) 
Age_q  0.0003 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0310) -0.0002 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0070) 0.0004 (0.0000) -0.0002 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0001) 
o_hhdinc  0.0000 (0.0050) 0.0000 (0.0860) 0.0000 (0.1180) 0.0000 (0.1080) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
do_hhdinc  0.0000 (0.0220) 0.0000 (0.2700) 0.0000 (0.0160) 0.0000 (0.6180) 0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) 
Sick  0.0488 (0.0070) -0.0028 (0.7680) -0.0490 (0.0000) 0.0030 (0.7670) 0.0573 (0.0085) -0.0459 (0.0060) -0.0092 (0.0057) 0.0447 (0.0125) 
foreign  -0.0623 (0.2430) 0.0061 (0.7390) 0.0588 (0.1960) -0.0025 (0.8200) 0.0003 (0.0351) -0.0094 (0.0238) 0.0099 (0.0198) 0.0141 (0.0551) 
st_alo5  -0.0992 (0.0170) 0.0181 (0.2370) 0.0601 (0.0600) 0.0209 (0.1760) -0.0060 (0.0207) -0.0106 (0.0127) 0.0110 (0.0136) -0.0547 (0.0307) 
lt_alo5  -0.0745 (0.0280) 0.0235 (0.1020) 0.0231 (0.3530) 0.0279 (0.0530) -0.0558 (0.0264) 0.0139 (0.0179) 0.0424 (0.0198) -0.0745 (0.0287) 
  regression parameters  regression parameters 
 
Wald chi
2 (54)   =    297.42 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.0658 
Log pseudolikelihood = -2770.9687 
Wald chi
2 (54)   =     774.72 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.1780 
Log pseudolikelihood = -3218.6851 
N 5386  6449 
(1) non-employment ⇒ non-employment, (2) non-employment ⇒ full-time, (3) non-employment ⇒ part-time, (4) non-employment ⇒ unemployment,  
      robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Table A-4.4c.: Marginal Effects of mlogit-regressions (non-employment in tw,)  
 
 Portugal  UK 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
si_hhd  0.0318 (0.0176) -0.0243 (0.0103) -0.0150 (0.0103) 0.0075 (0.0080) 0.0371 (0.0214) -0.0079 (0.0056) -0.0339 (0.0179) 0.0048 (0.0068) 
lopa_hhd  0.0188 (0.0144) -0.0127 (0.0090) -0.0038 (0.0099) -0.0023 (0.0024) 0.0127 (0.0158) -0.0076 (0.0034) -0.0104 (0.0137) 0.0053 (0.0052) 
nkid_hhd  0.0035 (0.0116) 0.0009 (0.0085) -0.0070 (0.0068) 0.0026 (0.0030) -0.0051 (0.0165) 0.0022 (0.0049) -0.0041 (0.0145) 0.0070 (0.0049) 
Oth_hhd  -0.0026 (0.0099) 0.0050 (0.0068) -0.0028 (0.0066) 0.0003 (0.0018) -0.0037 (0.0225) -0.0071 (0.0042) -0.0095 (0.0181) 0.0203 (0.0109) 
s_kid0-2  0.0263 (0.0107) -0.0110 (0.0065) -0.0152 (0.0081) -0.0001 (0.0013) 0.0500 (0.0098) -0.0165 (0.0036) -0.0201 (0.0082) -0.0133 (0.0035) 
s_kid3-6  0.0100 (0.0097) -0.0084 (0.0062) -0.0024 (0.0068) 0.0007 (0.0013) 0.0201 (0.0097) -0.0116 (0.0034) 0.0032 (0.0080) -0.0117 (0.0036) 
s_kid7-15  0.0104 (0.0055) -0.0048 (0.0033) -0.0056 (0.0039) 0.0000 (0.0008) 0.0092 (0.0054) -0.0043 (0.0018) -0.0016 (0.0047) -0.0033 (0.0015) 
unmarr  0.0224 (0.0122) -0.0060 (0.0086) -0.0198 (0.0070) 0.0035 (0.0029) 0.0212 (0.0147) 0.0015 (0.0048) -0.0283 (0.0117) 0.0057 (0.0050) 
Sep_div  -0.0516 (0.0281) 0.0356 (0.0206) 0.0041 (0.0169) 0.0119 (0.0074) -0.0516 (0.0192) 0.0152 (0.0079) 0.0256 (0.0156) 0.0108 (0.0055) 
y_edu  -0.0010 (0.0012) 0.0023 (0.0007) -0.0014 (0.0009) 0.0001 (0.0002) -0.0048 (0.0015) 0.0012 (0.0004) 0.0040 (0.0013) -0.0004 (0.0004) 
Age  -0.0026 (0.0034) -0.0003 (0.0022) 0.0019 (0.0023) 0.0011 (0.0006) -0.0082 (0.0044) 0.0029 (0.0014) 0.0032 (0.0038) 0.0021 (0.0010) 
Age_q  0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
o_hhdinc  0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
do_hhdinc  0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
Sick  0.0263 (0.0078) -0.0271 (0.0053) 0.0071 (0.0056) -0.0062 (0.0016) 0.0732 (0.0091) -0.0109 (0.0028) -0.0586 (0.0082) -0.0037 (0.0021) 
foreign  -0.0663 (0.0525) 0.0333 (0.0361) 0.0334 (0.0428) -0.0004 (0.0070) 0.0167 (0.0287) -0.0082 (0.0063) -0.0142 (0.0236) 0.0057 (0.0105) 
st_alo5  -0.0536 (0.0278) 0.0426 (0.0195) -0.0167 (0.0112) 0.0276 (0.0115) -0.0238 (0.0161) 0.0053 (0.0050) 0.0141 (0.0140) 0.0044 (0.0043) 
lt_alo5  -0.0777 (0.0175) 0.0435 (0.0127) 0.0087 (0.0094) 0.0255 (0.0070) 0.0101 (0.0185) 0.0020 (0.0061) -0.0319 (0.0148) 0.0198 (0.0083) 
  regression parameters  regression parameters 
 
Wald chi
2 (54)   =     440.77 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.0840 
Log pseudolikelihood = -3468.9349 
Wald chi
2 (54)   =     583.06 
Prob > chi
2     =     0.0000 
Pseudo R
2       =     0.1272 
Log pseudolikelihood = -2623.2383 
N 7463  5107 
(1) non-employment ⇒ non-employment, (2) non-employment ⇒ full-time, (3) non-employment ⇒ part-time, (4) non-employment ⇒ unemployment,  
      robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: ECHP, authors’ calculations. 
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